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Panel II: Indecency on the Internet:
Constitutionality of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
Moderator: Nicholas J. Jollymore, Esq.a
Panelists:
Parry Aftab, Esq.b
Preeta D. Bansal, Esq.c
Theodore C. Hirt, Esq.d
Chris Hansen, Esq.e
David H. Pawlik, Esq.f
MR. JOLLYMORE: Although this panel is entitled Indecency and the Internet: The Constitutionality of the 1996
Telecommunications Act, we will also address other issues.
My name is Nick Jollymore and I am a lawyer at Time
Inc., the book and magazine publishing subsidiary of Time
Warner, Inc. Until two years ago, the only business in which
Time Inc. was engaged was the publication of books and
magazines. As a print publisher, we were privileged to en-
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joy the broadest First Amendment protection available.1
1. Despite the First Amendment’s unambiguous language that Congress
create “no law” abridging free speech, U.S. CONST. amend. I, freedom of speech
has never been protected absolutely. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925) (“It is a fundamental principle long established, that the freedom of
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an
absolute right to speak or publish.”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571 (1942) (“It is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute.”); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (refusing to interpret the
First Amendment as protecting all speech); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1954) (stating that rejecting obscenity from First Amendment protection is implicit in the history of the First Amendment). The Supreme Court created and
has long recognized a hierarchy in the First Amendment’s protection of speech
from government regulation, affording greater protection to certain types of
speech, and leaving other forms of speech more vulnerable to regulation. For a
defense of such speech categorization, see John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization as Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). For an argument advocating the elimination of speech
categorization and affording all varieties of speech equal value, see O. Lee Reed,
Is Commercial Speech Really Less Valuable Than Political Speech? On Replacing Values and Categories in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (1996). The
Supreme Court explained in Roe v. Wade that such a speech hierarchy is not recognized by the U.S. Constitution:
The Constitution makes no mention of the rational-basis test, or the specific verbal formulations of intermediate and strict scrutiny by which
this Court evaluates claims . . . these tests or standards are not, and do
not purport to be rights protected by the Constitution. Rather, they are
judge-made methods for evaluating and measuring the strength and
scope of constitutional rights or for balancing the constitutional rights
of individuals against the competing interests of government.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The degree of First Amendment protection afforded speech generally depends on the type of speech involved. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 930 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that commercial speech, obscenity, child-pornography, and defamatory speech receive lesser, or no, First
Amendment protection because of their content, regardless of the media through
which they are communicated). The extent of First Amendment protection in the
electronic media, however, is related not to the content of the speech, but rather
to the medium in which the speech is communicated. Id. at 1003. Generally,
print media receives the highest level of protection of the communications media, while the electronic media, including broadcasting, cable television, and
computer networks, have received the lowest. The rationale cited by the courts
for hierarchical protection based on the type of medium in which speech is
communicated, as compared to the content of the speech, is technological characteristics of the media, which most commonly include pervasiveness and frequency scarcity. See The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1069-70 (1994).
Different news media receive varying degrees of First Amendment protec-
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Now, however, we also operate in the environment of cyberspace. Time Inc. has made a huge investment, funded by
our corporate parent, in online services. We have, I would
say, a very elaborate and one of the most popular World
Wide Web (“Web”)2 sites, called Pathfinder.3 Pathfinder
tion in accordance with the particular characteristics of each means of communication. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“We have long recognized
that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems.”)
(citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression, of
course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to
it, for each may present its own problems.”); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (applying a flexible First Amendment standard
to broadcast media due to its unique problem of scarcity, and stating that “differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them”); Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa
Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954, 960 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that newspaper and other
print media enjoy broad protection from government interference). The print
media has consistently been afforded the greatest First Amendment protection of
the various media. See Group W Cable, 669 F. Supp. at 959-60. For a discussion of
the degrees of protection afforded the different media, see generally Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987). For a persuasive
argument that the extent of protection afforded the different media should not be
based on technological considerations, see generally The Message in the Medium:
The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062,
1069-70 (1994); Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and
Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier, Keynote Address at the First Conference
on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991) (on file with Harvard Law
School Library) (“[T]he Constitution’s norms, at their deepest level, must be invariant under merely technological transformations.”).
2. The Web is one of three methods by which people can locate and retrieve
information on the Internet. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836 (E.D. Pa.), prob.
juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). It is the most technologically advanced information system on the Internet, as well as the most rapidly developing, easy-to-use, and popular means of
searching for and gathering information. Id. One commentator aptly explained
how it functions:
The Web is a system of ‘pages’ or ‘sites’ consisting of video, interactive
graphics, and text. ‘Hyperlinks’ connect the pages and enable users to
‘point and click’ their way through the Web. The first page, or screen,
of a location on the Web, or ‘Web site,’ is the ‘home page.’
Nicholas Robbins, Baby Needs a New Pair of Cybershoes: The Legality of Casino
Gambling on the Internet, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 7, ¶ 6 (1996) (citations omitted).
For a brief history and explanation of the basic operation of the Web, see ACLU,
929 F. Supp. at 836. For detailed information about the Web and its history, see
BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, WORLD WIDE WEB BIBLE 53-66 (2d ed. 1996). See also About
the
World
Wide
Web
(visited
May
28,
1997)

466

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[7:463

contains a collection of magazine and book contents from
both our own properties and those under license. We sell
advertising on it, and are looking forward to its eventually
making a profit.
Most, if not all, of our magazines have their own presence on the Web, if not as Web sites, then on one of the commercial services, such as America Online (“AOL”) or
CompuServe.4 Some of our magazine Web sites include, for
example, People Online, Time Online, Sports Illustrated Online, Sports Illustrated for Kids Online, Money Online, Fortune
Online, and Entertainment Weekly Online.5
For our editors, who are by and large print editors, and
for our lawyers, who are exclusively print lawyers, we are in
a new realm where it is no longer certain that we, as entities
<http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/WWW>.
3. Time, Time Warner’s Pathfinder (visited Apr. 16, 1997) <http://pathfinder.com>.
4. AOL and CompuServe are online service providers (“OSP’s”), which are
national businesses that provide individuals with a means of accessing the Internet. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 833. In contrast to Internet service providers (“ISP’s”)
which provide access to the Internet only, OSPs, in addition to providing Internet access, provide access to proprietary content unavailable to nonsubscribers.
See Gerald Leibovits & Ian M. Singer, Litigators who Untangle the Web Will Find
Scores of Valuable Sites, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 1997, at 5. AOL is currently the leading
OSP, with 8 million customers, Compuserve is the second-largest, with 5.3 million subscribers, Microsoft is third-largest with 2.2 million subscribers, and Prodigy is the fourth largest, with 900,000 subscribers. See Counting up the Online
Market, MULTIMEDIA WIRE, June 4, 1997 (1997 WL 7141311); Review & Comment on
the News, 5 REP. ON MICROSOFT 11, June 2, 1997 (1997 WL 8661561). Others estimate Microsoft Network’s subscriber list at 2.3 million. See Jon Schwartz, Microsoft Backs off From Net Access, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 1997, at C1 (1997 WL 6698669);
Stuart J. Johnston, Microsoft Grows On: Rising Sales and New Products Keep Growth
Rates Soaring, INFO. WEEK, June 2, 1997 (1997 WL 7602597). For a list of the 14
major internet service providers and their current number of subscribers, see
Counting up the Online Market, MULTIMEDIA WIRE, June 4, 1997 (1997 WL 7141311).
The “Big Three,” AOL, Compuserve, and Microsoft, hold over 75% of the U.S.
market, E-mail Ranks Swell by 12.5 Million in First Quarter, REP. ON ELECTRONIC
COM., June 3, 1997 (1997 WL 8582658), and 35% of the European market, Kimberly A. Strassel, On the Line: Small Internet Firms in EU Are Bracing For Consolidation, WALL. ST. J. EUR., at 1 (1997 WL-WSJE 3812207).
5. Time, Time Warner’s Pathfinder (visited Apr. 16, 1997) <http://pathfinder.com>.
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involved in cyberspace, enjoy the same broad First Amendment protection enjoyed by the print media.6 Although no
one knows exactly what is going to happen, we are certainly
interested in what the courts will do with the First Amendment issues related to the Internet (“Net”).7 I certainly am
excited to hear what our panelists have to say about it.
Before I introduce our panelists, however, let me briefly
outline the topics that we are going to discuss today. First,
we are going to talk about the Internet and what it is. Many
of us, including myself, are trying to understand what the it
is. In ACLU v. Reno,8 a case that we will discuss in some detail, Judge Sloviter of the Third Circuit made very extensive
findings of fact concerning cyberspace.9 These findings, in
my opinion, are some of the clearest statements about what
the Internet is and how it works. In his decision, Judge
Sloviter also made a rather sweeping statement regarding

6. See supra note 1 (explaining greater First Amendment protection afforded
print media).
7. The Internet currently consists of 13 million host computers, BRYAN
PFAFFENBERG, WORLD WIDE WEB BIBLE 36 (2d ed. 1996), linked by more than
50,000 connected computer networks. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 925. The Internet is
not controlled by a single entity, and the information found on it is actually located on individual computers throughout the world. Id. at 926. Approximately
30 to 60 million people currently have access to the Internet, and that number is
expected to exceed 100 million by 1998. JILL H. ELLSWORTH & MATTHEW V.
ELLSWORTH, MARKETING ON THE INTERNET 5 (2d ed. 1997) (quoting Vinton Cerf, an
early Internet developer, testifying to the United States House of Representatives). The Internet community has recently experienced exponential growth. See
Curt A. Canfield & Joseph Labbe, Web or Windows?: Planning for Internet/Intranet
Technology—Explosive growth Experienced, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 1997, at S2. The increased use of the Internet is due in part to increased advertising and ease of obtaining access. See Christopher Wolf & Scott Shorr, Cybercops Are Cracking Down
on Internet Fraud: Federal and State Officials Have Stepped Up Efforts in the Battle
Against Info-Highway Robbery, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B12.
8. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996) (holding
that speakers could not be held liable for indecent communication on the Internet because there were no effective means by which they could ensure that minors did not have access to speech).
9. Id. at 830-49 (detailing the nature and development of cyberspace, the
Internet, and the World Wide Web, and describing Internet access to sexually
explicit material, including existing and proposed methods of age verification).
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cyberspace, commenting that, “[t]he Internet is . . . a unique
and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication.”10
I, for one, think the statement is true and accurate. The
Internet is, indeed, unique for a number of reasons. First, no
single person controls it. In fact, control of Internet content
is dispersed among thousands, and probably millions, of individuals and/or entities.11 Therefore, the Internet is unlike
a printing press, a broadcast station, or a cable television system.
Second, the Internet is unique because there are very low
entrance barriers.12 The old saw that “freedom of the press
belongs to those who own one” is no longer true because the
barriers to entry on the Internet require an investment, as
Judge Sloviter estimated, of as little as maybe $2,000.13
Third, the Internet is unique because it is very popular;14
10. Id. at 844 (stating that “[t]he Internet is therefore a unique and wholly
new medium of worldwide communication.”).
11. Id. at 832 (“No single entity—academic, corporate, governmental, or
non-profit—administers the Internet[, rather it is] hundreds and thousands of
separate operators of computers and computer networks [without a] centralized . . . control point . . .”).
12. Id. at 843. The ACLU court described the unusually small entrance barriers:
The start up and operating costs entailed by communication on the
Internet are significantly lower than those associated with use of other
forms of mass communication, such as television, radio, newspapers,
and magazines. This enables operation of their own Web sites not only
by large companies, such as Microsoft and Time Warner, but also by
small, not-for-profit groups, such as Stop Prisoner Rape and Critical
Path AIDS Project.
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 843.
13. Id. at 833 (stating that “[w]ith an investment of as little as $2,000.00 and
the cost of a telephone line, individuals, non-profit organizations, advocacy
groups, and businesses can offer their own dial-in computer bulletin board service where friends, members, subscribers, or customers can exchange ideas and
information.”).
14. Id. at 831 (explaining the extraordinary growth of the Internet in recent
years, with fewer than 300 computers linked to the Internet in 1981, as compared
to over 9,400,000 in 1996). As of 1996, almost twelve million people in the United
States alone subscribed to one of the major commercial online services. Id. at 833.
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it has captured both our attention and our time. In Reno, the
three-judge panel estimated that there are now forty million
Internet users, and that by the end of the century there will
be 200 million users.15 Certainly, no single magazine has
such a circulation.
The power of the Internet makes a lot of people, including myself, nervous at times. For example, when I was getting ready for work yesterday, I heard a news report on National Public Radio that the Iraqi government newspaper
had published a report attacking the Internet as “‘the end of
civilizations, cultures, interests and ethics.’”16 The Iraqi
newspaper also alleged that the Internet “‘is one of the
American means to enter every house in the world. . . . They
want to become the only source for controlling human beings in the new electronic village.’”17
Another country struck with Internet-phobia is the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), which, you may have
heard, last year announced its intention to construct an
intranet for circulating information within the countries’
boundaries in order to further its goal of protecting its citizens from information from foreign sources.18
15. Id. at 831.
16. See Matthew McAllester, The Surfing Evangelists, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 1997,
at A41 (quoting the Iraqi government newspaper Al-Jumhuriya); Financial
DIGEST, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1997, at C8; Off the Ticker, Business, S.F. EXAMINER,
Feb. 18, 1997, at C1.
17. Id.
18. See CompuServe At Work on Forming Alliance to Enter Chinese Market,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 10, 1997, at 1F (discussing the PRC’s concern about giving its citizens access to politically sensitive or pornographic materials). China
established its intranet, the China Wide Web (“CWW”), because it wanted a
more controllable Internet as a result of its “nervousness about the openness of
the Internet and its belief that the Internet as a “threat to social order.” Mark LaPedus, China Intranet to Connect 50 Cities, ELECTRONIC BUYERS NEWS, Feb. 3, 1997,
at 66. In fact, China requires American citizens who sign up for CWW access to
register with local police and to promise not to commit crimes against the country. Id. CWW last year banned what it deemed “illegal Internet addresses,”
those addresses containing material it judged pornographic or politically sensitive, and recently banned the Web sites of CNN and the Wall Street Journal. Id.
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In the United States, we have our own reaction, based on
similar concerns, to the power of the Internet. But, because
we come from a First Amendment tradition, we have a much
more moderated response. That response is embodied, in
part, in several provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (“Telecom Act”),19 which we will discuss today.
The second topic this panel will discuss is the First
Amendment.20 I have been teaching a course here at Fordham Law School for fifteen years on the First Amendment
and mass media, and I can say one thing without equivocation: I have never met a student who is not in favor of the
First Amendment. The moral values embodied in the First
Amendment are part of a tradition that we all share, if not
cherish.21 I presume that that is true of our panelists as well,
An intranet is an internal computer network using Internet computer network
technology and effectively “sits on the side” of the Internet and can be connected
only when those controlling it allow. Mar. 31, 1997. One of the primary reasons
for the CWW is the facilitation of business dealings within the PRC. Id.
19. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Telecom Act].
20. The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. This hierarchy is based on the rationale that certain types of speech foster the values underlying the First Amendment—freedom of expression from
regulation—more than others. There is an ongoing debate regarding whether
the language of the First Amendment merely prohibits the government from limiting expression or whether it affirmatively requires the government to ensure
that every citizen is afforded equal expression. The First Amendment is traditionally viewed as prohibiting government from limiting freedom of expression.
See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374
(1996) (describing the values embodied by the First Amendment to include “an
overarching commitment to protect speech from Government regulation”).
Some of the most commonly recognized values underlying the First Amendment
include the encouragement of a “marketplace of ideas” and rich public debate.
The “marketplace of ideas” theory was first recognized by Justice Holmes in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), in which he described the marketplace of ideas concept as “the ultimate good desired is better reached by full
trade in ideas—the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). This
principle, as well as Justice Holmes’ language, has been consistently cited in U.S.
First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 257-59 (1986); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 530, 534 (1980), Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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and therefore that none of them is going to question the validity of the First Amendment as a legal principle.
The question regarding the First Amendment, then, is not
whether First Amendment protection should exist, but
rather how far it should extend. Should First Amendment
protection for the Internet be as extensive as that enjoyed by
print,22 or should it be as limited as that enjoyed by broadcast?23 Currently, we do not have a model; should there be
one?
It is not clear how the Supreme Court will approach the
For a comprehensive discussion of the historical developments of free speech
and a discussion of its underlying values, see U. Lee Reed, Is Commercial Speech
Really Less Valuable Than Political Speech? On Relaxing Values and Categories in
First Amendment jurisprudence, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 3-15 (1996).
22. See supra note 1 (discussing the greater First Amendment protection afforded print media and the differing degrees of protection afforded the various
communication media). For example, while the government requires broadcasters to provide free air time to those whom they criticize, Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the government does not require newspaper publishers to print the replies of the persons criticized by the print media, Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
23. The broadcast media enjoys the least amount of First Amendment protection within the communications industry, and thus is subject to the greatest
regulation by the government. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)
(“[O]f all the forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the
most limited First Amendment protection.”); id. at 741 n.17 (“[I]t is well settled
that the First Amendment has special meaning in the broadcasting context.”) (citing FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)). For a persuasive argument that broadcast media
should be free of government regulation and should receive the same broad First
Amendment protections as print media, see generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST Amendment (1988). Two of the most
commonly cited rationales for the lesser protection of the broadcast media are its
“unique pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans,” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
748, and its unique accessibility to children without parental supervision or the
ability to restrict the expression to adults, id. at 750. Among the other reasons
recognized for requiring greater regulation of the broadcast media are: (1) radio
receivers are in the home, a place where people’s privacy interest is entitled to
extra deference, see Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); (2) unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is
being or will be broadcast; and (3) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use
of which the government must therefore license in the public interest. Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 731 n.2.
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issue of First Amendment protection on the Internet. The
Court has just barely touched upon the First Amendment
model for cable television.24 We do not know how traditional controls over content, such as the body of tort law that
embraces privacy and defamation, will apply to the Internet.
Indeed, we do not even know if these principles are applicable to, that is, if they make sense or are workable on, the
Internet. Finally, we do not know how much commercial
speech is on the Internet and whether or not it makes sense
to have a legal regime under which such speech enjoys more
limited First Amendment protection, as it does in other media.25 All of these, and others, are open questions.
The third and final topic that we will discuss is the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”),26 which is part of
24. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (deciding
that “[f]undamental technological differences between broadcast and cable television transmission renders relaxed standard of scrutiny for broadcast regulation
inapplicable to First Amendment challenge of cable regulation; cable television
does not suffer from inherent limitations of broadcast television arising from
scarcity of available broadcast frequencies compared to number of would-be
broadcasters”).
25. Commercial speech is “speech that advertise[s] a product or service for
profit or for business purpose.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 271 (6th ed. 1990).
Commercial speech is one of the least protected types of speech, and in fact was
not afforded any protection until 1976. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In 1980, the Supreme Court formulated a four part test, which it continues to follow today, for
determining the validity of a regulation restricting commercial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). If a
the commercial speech at issue is truthful and not misleading, thus passing the
threshold factor, the Court evaluates whether the government has a substantial
interest in regulating the speech, whether the means of regulation further that
interest, and whether are the regulation is no more restrictive than necessary to
achieve its goal. Id. at 564.
26. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56,
133-36 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1996)). The CDA
seeks to regulate the Internet and other interactive computer services with regard to not only obscenity and child pornography, but also indecency. Modeled
after the federal dial-a-porn laws, the CDA is an attempt to keep indecent online
materials from children. Immediately after its passage, two pre-enforcement facial challenges to the CDA were brought in different courts. Both lawsuits assert
that the law violates the First and Fifth Amendments. ACLU v. Reno; American
Library Association v. United States Dep’t of Justice, Consolidated Nos. 96-963,

1997]

SYMPOSIUM⎯CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CDA

473

the Telecom Act. Two lawyers on this panel are directly involved in the constitutional challenge to the CDA that is currently before the Supreme Court, and the other panelists, I
think, are familiar to very familiar with that case.
The CDA, to oversimplify, prohibits obscene transmissions on the Internet.27 “Obscene” is, what I would call and
96-1458 (E.D. Pa.) and Shea v. Reno, 96 Civ. 976 (S.D.N.Y.). The CDA provides
that any facial constitutional challenge to the Act will be heard by a three-judge
district court. Courts in both cases issued decisions preliminarily enjoining enforcement of the Act.
The Act provides that any interlocutory or final judgment, decree holding
any provision of the Act unconstitutional, shall be reviewable as a matter of right
by direct appeal to the Supreme Court. On December 6, the Court noted probable jurisdiction in the ACLU/ALA case, and later held the Shea case pending
resolution of ACLU/ALA.
27. Id. § 502(a)(1)(B) [hereinafter the “indecency provision] Section
223(a)(1)(B), the “indecency provision,” subjects to a criminal fine and/or imprisonment of no more than two years, anyone:
(1) in interstate or foreign communications . . . (B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly—(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of
age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the
call or initiated the communication; . . . (2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity.
47 U.S.C.A. § 233(a)(1)(B). Although the Telecom Act does not define “telecommunications device,” the ACLU court agreed with its parties’ submission that the
plain meaning and legislative history of the act supported the conclusion that a
modem was included within this definition. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 829 n.5.
The new Section 223(d) of 47 U.S.C. provides, in pertinent part: (d) Whoever—
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly—
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether
the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such per-
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others have called, hardcore pornography. Such material is
outside the protection of the First Amendment, as the Supreme Court decided in Roth v. United States28 and Miller v.
California.29 Therefore, the CDA’s provision prohibiting obscenity is not a controversial aspect of the CDA. Because obscene transmissions are outside the protection of the First
Amendment, it is unlikely that any of our panelists will argue that obscenity deserves First Amendment protection.
The controversial parts of the CDA are a number of provisions that deal with indecency on the Internet.30 To oversimplify again, those provisions prohibit, and, in fact, impose criminal sanctions on, the transmission of indecent
material if it will get into the hands of minors.31 The CDA
son’s control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with
the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under title 18,
United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d).
28. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth was the first case in which the Supreme Court
was forced to face the issue of whether or not the First Amendment protects obscene materials. Most importantly, the Court, in considering the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing the mailing of obscene material, established its first
test for determining whether or not material is obscene, asking “whether, to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.” Id. at
488-89.
29. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Supreme Court revised its obscenity
standard established in Roth by formulating a three-part test for identifying obscene material:
(a) whether the average person applying contemporary standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24.
30. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)-(h). The statute’s indecency provision fails to define the term indecency, and although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the
issue, it has recognized the potential conflict. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 850-51
(“Notwithstanding Congress’ familiarity with Pacifica, it enacted § 223(a), covering ‘indecent’ communications, without any language confining ‘indecent’ to
descriptions or depictions of ‘sexual or excretory activities or organs,’ language
it included in the reference to ‘patently offensive’ in § 223(d)(1)(B).”).
31. The indecency provisions subject violators to criminal penalties of a
maximum of two years imprisonment and/or a fine. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a); see
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also provides certain defenses that we will probably touch
on today as well.32
The challenge to the CDA was brought by a number of
interested parties. The American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) led one charge,33 and the American Library Association (“ALA”) led another.34 Those two cases were consolidated and, last June, a three-judge panel in Philadelphia
ruled that the CDA is unconstitutional.35 The case is now before the United States Supreme Court.36 The government
filed its brief last month and the ACLU will file its brief tomorrow.
Now let me introduce our panelists. David Pawlik is
with the Communications Group at Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom in the firm’s Washington, D.C. office.
David’s clients include Bell operating companies, wireless
cable carriers, broadcasters, and firms that write and publish
Internet software. Before David entered law school, he spent
twenty years in broadcasting and broadcast advertising.

ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849-50.
32. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e). The statute explicitly recognizes various “safe harbor” defenses, including, inter alia, individuals who merely provide Internet access and do not create the offensive material, id. § 223(e)(1), mere employers of
violators, id. § 223(e)(4), and those who in good faith attempt to prevent access to
minors through “reasonable, effective, and appropriate means,” id. § 223(e)(5)(A),
including “requiring the use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access
code, or adult personal identification number,” id. § 223(e)(5)(B).
33. See Brief for Petitioner American Civil Liberties Union at 9, ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-963) (consolidated with No. 961458). The ACLU filed its action the very day the CDA was signed into law, February 8, 1996, moving for a temporary restraining order to enjoin enforcement of
the CDA’s amendments to sections 223(a)(1)(B) (the “indecency provision”) and
223(d)(1) (the “patently offensive provision”) of the Telecom Act.
34. Brief for American Library Association, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-1458) (consolidated with No. 96-963). Soon after the
ACLU, the ALA filed its action, which was substantially similar. ACLU at 82728.
35. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on
March 19, 1996. 1997 WL 136253 (U.S. Oral Argument—DIGEST).
36. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 19, 1996. 1997 WL
136253 (U.S. Oral Argument—DIGEST).
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Preeta Bansal is a lawyer with a broad background in
communications issues. She is currently at the New York office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, where she is a litigator specializing in libel, copyright, and constitutional issues. Before
she joined Gibson, Dunn, Preeta served in the Clinton Administration as Special Counsel to the Office of White House
Counsel working on litigation matters and Supreme Court
nominations. She also worked as a counselor to the Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, where she coordinated policy and litigation matters involving intellectual property, high-technology
network industries, and international enforcement. She supervised the antitrust investigation of Microsoft, and was
also involved in issues relating to violence on television. Before government service, Preeta was in private practice
where she worked on the “must carry” cable television litigation, which concluded in the Supreme Court in the Turner37
case.
Chris Hansen has had a long and distinguished career as
a public interest lawyer. Chris is currently Senior Staff
Counsel at the ACLU. He has been with the ACLU for the
past twelve years, first as Special Litigation Counsel, then as
Associate Director of the Children’s Rights Project, and since
1993 in his present position as Senior Staff Counsel. Before
joining the ACLU, Chris was with the New York Civil Liberties Union for four years. He was also Director of the Mental
Patients’ Rights Project, and was an attorney for the Mental
Health Law Project and the Legal Aid Society of New York.
Chris is an active speaker, legal scholar, and author, and has
taught at Hofstra Law School as an Adjunct Professor.
Among the many litigations in which Chris has been involved are cases concerning mental health, children’s rights,
and a broad array of constitutional cases, including some
important desegregation cases and many First Amendment
37. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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cases.
Chris is presently involved in four cases concerning First
Amendment issues on the Internet. One of those cases is the
case upon which this panel will focus today, ACLU v. Reno,38
which, as I said, challenges the CDA on constitutional
grounds. Chris argued that case last year on behalf of the
ACLU and its co-plaintiffs before the three-judge panel that
ruled in his favor.39 He is actively involved in the appeal
now pending before the Supreme Court.40
Ted Hirt is a lawyer with the Department of Justice
where he specializes in constitutional issues. Ted is the Assistant Branch Director of the Federal Programs Branch of
Justice, which is the branch that defends the constitutionality
of federal statutes. That branch is involved in issues ranging
from the Brady gun control law,41 which involves both Second and Tenth Amendment constitutional issues, and a wide
array of First Amendment issues. One of Ted’s primary specialties is telecommunications issues, especially First
Amendment work. Ted is the author of several articles on
constitutional issues, including First Amendment matters
and litigation practices.42 He has participated in the Department of Justice training program on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, discovery in pretrial practice, and financial
institutions regulation. Finally, Ted supervised the govern38. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
39. Id. at 833 (holding the CDA unconstitutional).
40. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 19, 1997. ACLU v.
Reno:
A
Chronology
(visited
June
9,
1997)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/n050896.htm/>. For a transcript of the oral argument, see 1997 WL 136253.
41. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 925A (1994)) (establishing a national computer system for instant checks of information on criminal backgrounds of potential gun purchasers to be made operational for use by gun sellers within five
years).
42. See, e.g., Theodore C. Hirt, “Symbolic Union” of Church and State and the
“Endorsement” of Sectarian Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823 (1989).
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ment attorneys involved in ACLU v. Reno.
Last, but not least, is Parry Aftab. Parry is a cyberspace
and technology law expert. She is a partner of Aftab &
Savitt, a Paramus, New Jersey law firm that has been recognized for its innovative practice using technology. You can
reach its Web site at <www.aftab.com>. Parry is also the
founder of the Virtual Law Firm Network, which is a network of lawyers that operates somewhat in the manner of a
large firm but is organized through cyberspace.43 The network has specialists in international and United States tax
law, environmental law, regulatory law, trusts and estates
law, and criminal matters.44 Parry is also the host of America Online’s Legal Information Network discussion board
and Court TV Law Center’s Legal Help Line. Finally, Parry
created and runs Law Talk, which is a legal discussion forum on the Women’s Interest Board on America Online.
Those are our panelists. I thank you all for joining us. I
would now like to ask Dave Pawlik to begin with the opening statement.
MR. PAWLIK: Thank you. I first want to say that I am
here substituting for Toni Cook Bush, who sends her apologies.
The Internet has been called “an untrammelled, uncontrolled, wholly liberated ocean of information” and “a great
egalitarian town meeting.”45 Considering the vastness of its
libraries and files, and the diversity of its contributors, it is
no wonder that this ocean contains not only the waves of art,
literature, and information, but also less edifying artifacts
43. See Aftab & Savitt, P.C., The Virtual Law Network (VLFN) (visited Apr. 20,
1997) <http://aftab.com/vlfnet.htmvlfn/>; Parry Aftab, Sophistication Not Size
Matters, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at 40.
44. See, e.g., Karen Mills, Investing in Indonesia (visited Apr. 20, 1997)
<http://aftab.com/millsart.htm> (supplying an article written by VLFN’s Indonesian member).
45. Quotation from The Spectator, Feb. 4, 1995, reprinted in 141 CONG. REC.
S9018 (daily ed. June 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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lurking deep in its darkness. This variety becomes a problem only because this ocean is frequently “surfed” by our
children, who, in many families, are the most computerliterate members of the household.
Senator Exon warned us that the Internet was filled with
dark places.46 He compiled examples of what was available
for downloading and displayed the resulting collection of
pornography in his famous “blue book.”47 Senator Grassley
amplified Congress’ concern by citing a Carnegie Mellon
study that was subsequently published in the Georgetown
Law Review48 and was the subject of a Time magazine cover
story.49 Although the Carnegie Mellon study has been criti46. “[The Internet] is a great boon to mankind. But we should not ignore the
dark roads of pornography, indecency and obscenity it makes possible.” Sen.
Exon, Letter to the Editor, WASH. POST., Dec. 2, 1995, at A20. See also 141 CONG.
REC. S8089 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon) (discussing the plethora of pornography available on the Internet and expressing concern for children’s exposure to such material). Upon his initial introduction of the CDA on
February 1, 1995, Senator Exon warned that without the passage of his legislation, the information superhighway would become a red light district. 141
CONG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995).
47. Id. Senator Exon included some of the “rawer” Internet images in a blue
folder and invited his colleagues to view them at his desk. Id. The pictures in
the folder “made Playboy and Hustler look like Sunday-school stuff.” Id. The
bill passed 84 to 16, many say because “[a]t the end of the debate—which was
carried live on c-span—few Senators wanted to cast a nationally televised vote
that might later be characterized as pro-pornography.
48. Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A
Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5
Million Times by Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and
Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849 (1995).
49. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995,
at 38, reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S9017-02. The Carnegie Mellon study, entitled
Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway, reported the results
of a team who surveyed 917,410 sexually explicit pictures, descriptions, short
stories, and film clips over an 18 month period. 141 CONG. REC. at S9019. One of
the most amazing and most often cited findings of the report was that 83.5% of
the pictures on Usenet groups where digitized images are stored are pornographic. Id. Many of the images are of things that cannot be found in common
pornographic materials (though most pictures are scanned from existing photographs): “pedophilia (nude photos of children), hebephilia (youths) and
paraphilia—a grab bag of deviant material that includes images of bondage, sadomasochism, urination, defecation, and sex acts with a barnyard full of ani-
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cized50 and the Time story may have misinterpreted the
study,51 the resulting concern in Congress and in homes
across the nation gave us the CDA—new regulation in a deregulatory era.
Senator Leahy, with support from Senators Levin, Biden,
and Feingold, led the opposition to the CDA.52 Even
Speaker Gingrich, who proudly introduced the House of
Representatives’ Internet-based system, “Thomas,”53 commented that the CDA was a violation of free speech.54 The
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Justice Department, and the Chairman of the FCC
also joined the opposition to the CDA.55 In the end, the
CDA’s opposition was ineffective. Its passage was guaranteed by both lawmakers’ fears of appearing to favor pornography in an election year and the overwhelming popularity
of the Telecom Act to which the CDA was attached.
There is no question that pornography exists on the
Internet. Even the staunchest supporters of Internet freedom
mals.” Id. The study does point out that “pornographic image files, despite their
evident popularity, represent only about 3 percent of all the messages on the
Usenet newsgroups, while the Usenet itself represents only 11.5 percent of the
traffic on the Internet. Id.
50. See, e.g., Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating the Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49
FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 53-57 (1996) (discussing common criticisms of the Rimm
study, including its methodology and lack of peer review); Donna L. Hoffman &
Thomas P. Novak, A Detailed Analysis of the Conceptual, Logical, and Methodological Flaws in the article, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway
(version
1.01,
July
2,
1995)
<http://www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu/rimm.cgi>.
51. See Hoffman & Novak, A Detailed Critique of the Time Article: “On a
Screen Near You:
Cyberporn” (1995) (visited Apr. 16, 1997)
<http://www.hotwired.com/spe-cial/pornscare/hoffman.html>.
52. Cannon, supra note 50, at 65.
53. Thomas (visited June 9, 1997) <http://www.thomas.gov>. The Thomas
site was named for Thomas Jefferson. Id.
54. See Cannon, supra note 51, at 67. Denouncing the Exon amendment,
House speaker Newt Gingrich stated: “It is clearly a violation of free speech and
it’s a violation of the right of adults to communicate with each other.” 141 CONG.
REC. S9017-02, at S9020.
55. Canon, supra note 51, at 69-70.
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will generally concede that some material on the Internet
may be harmful to children. The challenge presented to
Congress, therefore, was how to address this situation without infringing on the First Amendment rights of adult Internet users.
The nature of the Internet makes its regulation a monumental task. There is no Internet “headquarters” with operational control to assure that only appropriate material is
provided to children. Nor is there a bank of data libraries
where material can be marked as “child-friendly.” Indeed,
the Internet is the epitome of widely-distributed information
processing and storage technologies. It is a “network of
networks”56 designed to be self-healing. In the event that
any link between its sites is broken, the network will route
information around the break using self-maintaining redundant links without any human intervention.57
Censorship would be treated as just another break to be
worked around. For example, if every file that could be considered indecent were somehow purged from every U.S.
Internet server, the same material could find its way right
back into the Internet from an overseas source with hardly a
noticeable lag in search and retrieval time.

56. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 830 (“The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups
of linked computer networks. It is thus a network of networks.”).
57. Id. at 831-32 (stating that the Internet was designed to be a “decentralized, self-maintaining series of redundant links between computers and computer networks, capable of rapidly transmitting communications without direct
human involvement or control, and with the automatic ability to re-route communications if one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise unavailable [particularly if the] network were damaged, say, in a war.”). For example, a
computer message traveling from Washington to Baltimore that encounters broken or busy links on the most direct path may be automatically routed from
Washington to Chicago to New York to Baltimore without a meaningful delay or
without either the sender or receiver becoming aware of the rerouting. ED KROL,
THE WHOLE INTERNET: USER’S GUIDE & CATALOG, 20-23 (3d ed. 1993); see also
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831 (“A communication sent over this redundant series of
linked computers could travel any of a number of routes to its destination.”).
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The use of the Internet has grown widely and rapidly to
the point where its use is shared by adults and children of all
ages for business, for education, and for pleasure.58 Internet
users from around the world may access Web sites, chat
rooms, bulletin boards, and other Net locations created and
supported by commercial entities, educational institutions,
and even private individuals.59 Material that many may
consider to be pornographic can be found in all forms at
each of these types of Internet locations. What is more,
Internet material may be stored and accessed with a degree
of anonymity that would make Joe Klein60 envious.
Notwithstanding the practical considerations of regulating Internet content, the First Amendment issues are equally
imposing. The CDA seeks to protect children from indecent
material. Rather than invent a new “harmful to children”
standard or redefine “indecency,” Congress adopted the
definition of indecency used by the Supreme Court in
Pacifica,61 the case involving George Carlin’s “Seven Dirty

58. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (estimating the current and
projected numbers of Internet users). Although the Internet has existed for almost 30 years, it has gained popularity only in the past five years. ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 831. For a comprehensive discussion of the origins and development of
the Internet, see HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING
ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 65-70 (1993). While the Internet was used almost
exclusively by researchers in government and at educational institutions, it has
changed dramatically in a short period of time, as both the types of persons who
use the Internet and the purposes for which they use it have expanded tremendously. Id.
59. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a) (West Supp. 1996) (setting forth findings of Congress regarding the growth, use, and benefits of the Internet and other interactive
computer services); see also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832-34 (noting the increased
variety of means through which individuals can access the Internet, including
educational institutions, corporations and other employers, free local community
networks, libraries, coffee shops, commercial and noncommercial Internet service providers, online services, or bulletin board systems).
60. Joe Klein is the author of the best-selling novel, Primary Colors, published
under the pseudonym of “Anonymous.” The public curiosity surrounding the
identity of the author was great, and Joe Klein was discovered by the press to be
the true author only after much investigation.
61. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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Words You Can’t Say on TV” monologue.62 Pacifica, and
subsequently the CDA, define indecency as:
[A]ny comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs . . . .63
The CDA contains two principal prohibitions. The first
provision makes it a criminal act to send an indecent message to a specific person or persons under the age of eighteen.64 Although prohibiting communications directed specifically at children would be difficult to detect and
prosecute. The provision seems at first glance to be reasonable and narrowly tailored to prohibit conduct that is reprehensible to most Americans.65 However, the legal definition
of “indecency” under the CDA also would include works of
art and literature that may be important to the education of a

62. The transcript of Mr. Carlin’s monologue is reprinted verbatim in an appendix to Pacifica. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751; ACLU, American Civil Liberties Union, Freedom Network (visited Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org>. For a discussion of how George Carlin’s monologue might be treated on the Internet, see
generally Stacey J. Rappaport, Rules of the Road: The Constitutional Limits of Restricting Indecent Speech on the Information Superhighway, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1995).
63. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B); 438 U.S. at 752.
64. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(A); see supra note 27 (setting forth statutory language).
65. When the government attempts to regulate speech based on its content,
the regulation is subject “strict scrutiny.” Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-62
(1980). The regulation must be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and [be] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
270 (1981). Alternatively, if the regulation is not based on the speech’s content, it
will receive intermediate scrutiny wherein it will be deemed constitutional if it
furthers an “important or substantial” government interest and is no greater than
is essential.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 263, 270 (1981). The lowest level
of protection is afforded to, among other categories of speech, indecent speech,
wherein the government must simply have a valid or legitimate purpose for
regulating the speech and the regulation must be merely “rationally related” to
limiting the speech. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54
(1938).
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sixteen- or seventeen-year-old.66
The CDA’s second prohibition makes it a crime to post
anything indecent on the Internet where a minor might have
access to it.67 This is the most controversial portion of the
CDA because it holds the strongest threat to First Amendment freedoms. The CDA’s definition of indecency causes
controversy as well, as its reference to “contemporary community standards”68 begs the question of what community a
court should look to. Should it look to the community of the
person who posts material on the Internet or the community
of the person who downloads material from the Internet?
Or perhaps the Internet itself is an electronic community
without a geographic location.
The current standard for determining the community regarding the interstate transport of materials is to use the
community standards of the geographic area where the material is sent—that is, where the message is downloaded.69
Last year, this standard was upheld on appeal in the highly
publicized case United States v. Thomas,70 in which electronic
images were transmitted, from computer to computer over
phone lines, not using the Internet.71 The defendant, Thomas, allowed a customer in Tennessee to download photographs from Thomas’ California computer. Thomas, the
ACLU, and other amici argued that computer technology re66. See supra note 30 (indicating that the CDA does not explicitly define indecency).
67. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B); see supra note 27 (setting forth statutory language).
68. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1460-1469 (West Supp. 1996) (codifying the judicially
created doctrine in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957), which judges
indecency according to contemporary community standards).
69. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974) (deeming constitutional the judging of contemporary community standards according to local
community standards where obscene mail violating obscenity statute is transmitted); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973) (declining to require a national
standard in evaluating “contemporary community standards” and stating that
local standards should control).
70. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
71. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710.

1997]

SYMPOSIUM⎯CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CDA

485

quires a new definition of community—one based on cyberspace.72 The court disagreed, and instead found that Thomas knew the location of the person downloading material
from his computer, and stated that, if he did not want to
abide by Tennessee community standards, he could have refrained from selling access to his computer images to a Tennessee resident.73
If this same rationale is applied to information posted on
the Internet, the standards of the most conservative community in the United States could be applied to every item
posted on the Internet. Thomas dealt with a private, dial-in
computer bulletin board, not the Internet.74 If Thomas had
posted his material to a free, public Usenet75 bulletin board,
or had incorporated it into a Web page that was available to
anonymous users, he would have had no knowledge of the
communities in which his material was being downloaded.
The court’s admonition to choose an audience with community standards in mind could not apply to a large portion of
the Internet.76 If the Internet user cannot determine which
community standard is applicable, he will be motivated, by
fear of criminal penalties, to steer far away from anything
that could be found to be unpalatable in the most conservative of communities. The chilling effect this would have on
the exercise of free speech is obvious.77
72. Id. at 711.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 704.
75. The Usenet is a user-sponsored newsgroup, also known as a distributed
message database. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834. Usenet groups are similar to
listservs, see supra note 195 and accompanying text, in that they are “open discussions and exchanges on particular topics.” Id. at 835. Unlike listservs, and
more similar to “bulletin boards,” see supra note 171, Usenet newsgroups can be
accessed at any time, without needing to subscribe. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835.
Usenet actually predates the Internet, but today, the Internet is used to transfer
much of Usenet’s traffic. See ED HOHL, THE WHOLE INTERNET SM (2d ed. 1994).
76. Id. at 711.
77. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851 (agreeing with plaintiffs and declaring
that “the challenged provisions, if not enjoined, will have a chilling effect on
[speakers’] free expression”).
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As the Court recognized in Pacifica, indecent material,
unlike obscene material, is protected by the First Amendment.78 Children may be protected from indecent material
by measures that seek to channel such material to protect
children from exposure to it, while not absolutely banning
the material for adults.79 To withstand a constitutional challenge, a law curbing indecent material must be narrowly
drawn to serve the interests of protecting children. Lawmakers must choose the least restrictive means to further the
government’s interest.80
In Sable, the Supreme Court case involving “dial-a-porn”
services, the Court noted that First Amendment protection
and the type of channeling that may be permitted for indecent material depends upon the attributes of the medium
through which the material is presented.81 For instance, the
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in Butler v. Michigan,82 held unconstitutional a law restricting the public’s access to certain books in order to shield juvenile innocence.
The Court commented that such a law effectively “burn[ed]
the house to roast the pig.”83 According to the Court, other
less restrictive means, such as permitting sales to adults
only, would have satisfied the government’s interest without
unduly restricting the rights of adults to access materials
protected by the First Amendment.84

78. 438 U.S. at 746. “Obscenity” may be thought of as “indecency” that: (1)
appeals to prurient interests, and (2)
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific merit. Id. at 739-42. The second of these factors is commonly referred to as the SLAPS test. See infra note 113
and accompanying text.
79. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989) (holding
unconstitutional a ban on the interstate transmission of indecent commercial
telephone messages).
80. Id.; see also supra note 66 (explaining the least restrictive means requirement).
81. Id.
82. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
83. Id. at 383.
84. Id. at 384.

1997]

SYMPOSIUM⎯CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CDA

487

Pacifica involved the “uniquely pervasive” presence of
broadcasting in the home and the accessibility of broadcasting to children.85 Even a child who cannot read could have
his vocabulary significantly enlarged by listening to George
Carlin’s monologue.86 The constitutionally sound solution
was to channel indecent material to hours of the broadcast
day when children are not likely to be present in the audience.87 The Court also noted that outside of the home the
balance between the First Amendment rights of a speaker
and those of a listener tips in favor of the speaker, requiring
an offended listener just to turn away, as in the case of a
drive-in movie showing indecent films.88
The Supreme Court has previously declined to adopt the
broadcast model for cable television because of what it refers
to as fundamental technological differences.89 But, more recently, cable has been found to have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans, and therefore to be as accessible to children as over-the-air broadcasting, if not more so.90 Last year, a three-judge panel found
that the Telecom Act’s provisions restricting the carriage of
sexually explicit or indecent programming91 were narrowly

85. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
86. Id. at 749 (“Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary
in an instant.”).
87. Id. at 733.
88. Id. at 749 n.27 (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)).
89. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (deciding
that “[f]undamental technological differences between broadcast and cable television transmission renders relaxed standard of scrutiny for broadcast regulation
inapplicable to First Amendment challenge of cable regulation; cable television
does not suffer from inherent limitations of broadcast television arising from
scarcity of available broadcast frequencies compared to number of would-be
broadcasters”).
90. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct.
2374, 2386 (1996).
91. Referring to Section 505 of the CDA, Title V of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, cited in Playboy Entert. Group, Inc.
v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 774 (D. Del. 1996).
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tailored and passed First Amendment scrutiny.92 The Telecom Act requires cable programming distributors to either
fully scramble both the audio and video portions of channels
containing indecent material93 or channel the indecent programming to times when children are not likely to be present in the audience.94
But, at least for now, the Internet is not as pervasive or
prevalent in American homes as broadcast television or cable. Furthermore, unlike watching television, using the
Internet is an active, rather than a passive, function.
Accessing the Internet may be compared to using the
public switched telephone network for private commercial
telephone communications. In Sable, dial-a-porn services
were held to be substantially different from broadcasting.95
In contrast to television viewing, where the Court found that
the public has no meaningful opportunity to avoid contact
with indecent material,96 the dial-in situation requires a listener to take affirmative steps to receive a communication.97
Credit cards and access codes were determined to be acceptable channeling mechanisms capable of protecting children
from indecent phone messages.98 An absolute ban on indecent phone messages cannot be justified by speculation that
enterprising youngsters can and will evade the rules and
gain access to phone sex services.99
So, the next question is what model should be used for
Internet material. The Internet is not a passive medium. It
requires loading software, establishing an account and a
connection, and actively searching for materials. Addition92.
1996).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Playboy Entert. Group, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del.
47 U.S.C.A. § 561(a) (West Supp. 1996).
47 U.S.C.A. § 561(b) (West Supp. 1996).
497 U.S. at 127.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 129.
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ally, downloading, decoding, and viewing material of the
type in Senator Exon’s blue book takes some degree of computer expertise—although such expertise is well within the
grasp of a computer literate twelve-year-old. If the Sable
model is chosen, indecent materials may not be prohibited,
but some reasonable means of attempting to determine the
age of a user may be required as a method of channeling indecent material toward adults. Even if the Pacifica broadcast/cable model is adopted, the First Amendment requires
channeling rather than the complete elimination of indecent
material.
Channeling on the Internet, however, may well be impossible. Time channeling will not work because computer
file servers are available for access at all hours, not to mention the fact that, with a network that spans the globe, it is
always midnight somewhere. Certain commercial sites with
adult-oriented material require credit cards or age verification services,100 which themselves use credit cards, for access. This is no solution, however, for the vast Usenet collection of bulletin boards available without additional charge
beyond that required for access to the net.
Commercial services, such as AOL, provide software
screening mechanisms for parental supervision of access to
certain Internet areas.101 But the software is not foolproof
100. An Age Verification service, such as 18 Plus, Adult Check, and iSheild,
requires a subscriber to provide personal information, primarily credit card information. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 839-42. The Age Verification system operator
purportedly checks the validity of the credit card (by charging an annual fee,
usually less than $10, to the card) and issues a password/ID number, which can
then be used to gain access to the web pages “protected” by the Age Verification
system. Id.
101. Id. at 839. Examples of screening software designed to limit children’s
access to the Internet include CyberPatrol, CYBERsitter, The Internet Filter, Net
Nanny, Parental Guidance, SurfWatch, Netscape Proxy Server, and WebTrack.
Id. The competition among the software companies is greatly increasing as the
market for such software rapidly expands. ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 839. Net Nanny
is one type of age verification software that is designed to allow those concerned
to filter unwanted material on the Internet. Id. For an explanation of the differ-
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and can be bypassed by curious and ingenious children.
Other programs, like Net Nanny, Cyber Patrol,102 and
SurfWatch,103 operate through the use of databases containing lists of sites with indecent material. With new sites
added every day, however, these programs have obvious
flaws. The World Wide Web Consortium, a group of software and service companies active in the Internet, has developed a set of technical specifications that permit filtering
software to screen out Web pages containing certain types of
material. This system, the Platform for Internet Content Selection (“PICS”),104 can be used either for self-rating by
Internet publishers, or by independent rating agencies.105
These software solutions show promise, and because they do
not involve government action—even though some of them
were prompted by the CDA—they do not present First
Amendment problems.
So, the problem of Internet pornography definitely exists
as a threat to the welfare of our children. Nonetheless, the
CDA is not without its own problems as a threat to free
speech on the Internet. The Supreme Court is presented
with an intriguing and important case, ably argued by both
ent types of age verification systems, see id.
102. Cyber Patrol, manufactured by Microsystems Software, Inc., was one of
the first software packages, introduced in August 1995, designed to “give parents
the comfort that their children can reap the benefits of the Internet while shielding them from objectionable or otherwise inappropriate materials based on the
parent’s own particular tastes and values.” Id. at 839-40. Cyber Patrol’s slogan is
“to Surf and Protect.” See Microsystems Software Website, (visited Apr. 20, 1997)
<http://www.microsys.com/ cyber/default.htm>; see also Cyber Patrol by MSI
“To
Surf
and
Protect”
(visited
Apr.
20,
1997)
<http://www.cybernothing.org/jdtalk/media-coverage/archive/msgD3082.
html>.
103. SurfWatch is another type of age verification system. ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 841 (detailing the availability of SurfWatch software).
104. The PICS program was initiated by the World Wide Web Consortium
to “develop technical standards that would support parents’ ability to filter and
screen material that their children see on the Web.” ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838.
PICS, when complete, will provide ratings for Web sites, facilitating parents’
ability to filter what their children are exposed to on the Internet. Id.
105. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 839; W3C, Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) (visited Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS/>.
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sides. We can speculate on what the ramifications of the
Court’s decision might be.
If the CDA is found to be unconstitutional, parents will
continue to seek methods of protecting their children when
they themselves are not available to supervise their children’s Internet use. We can expect commercial services,
such as AOL, to strengthen and to promote their internal filtering mechanisms. We can also expect new “all-kid” or
family oriented online services to develop. The protection
from indecent material offered by such services would provide a clear advantage to accessing the Internet through
them, as opposed to direct connection through Internet service providers. Additionally, software programs will proliferate both as add-ins to browsers,106 like Netscape Navigator, and as stand-alone products. Many companies will take
advantage of the PICS system. Parents may find that they
have to pay more attention to what their kids are doing on
their computers. They may also need to initiate some frank
family discussions about the materials that are out there and
how a responsible child should handle such material when it
appears.
On the other hand, if the CDA is upheld, credit card authentication and Age Verification systems will flourish on
the Internet because they represent a viable method of protecting Internet publishers from criminal liability.107 Free
Web pages originating in the United States will be severely

106. A web browser provides the user with Internet access to both topical
directories and search engines. Eugene Volokh, Law and Computers: Computer
Media for the Legal Profession, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2058, 2064 (1996); see also Carl Oppedahl, Analysis and Suggestions Regarding NSI Domain Name Trademark Dispute
Policy, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 97 n.73 (1996).
107. But see ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 845 (“There is no effective way to determine the identity or age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail
exploders, newsgroups or chat rooms. . . . For these reasons, there is no reliable
way for a sender to know if the e-mail recipient is an adult or minor.”); ACLU,
929 F. Supp. at 846 (“Verification of a credit card over the Internet is not now
technically possible.”).
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curtailed in content, primarily through self-censorship by
Internet publishers who do not want to risk running afoul of
the community standard of the most socially conservative
community in the nation. We can expect to see some informal contests to determine which community will hold that
title. The old question, “Will it play in Peoria?” may become
the motto of Internet publishers.
Additionally, foreign Usenet servers, bulletin boards, and
Web servers will flourish because the interest in sexually
oriented material will not evaporate; it will merely migrate
overseas.108 State legislators will be eager to adopt their own
versions of the CDA, as protecting children and fighting
pornographers are popular causes that may be expected to
attract votes and campaign contributions.
The recent revision to New York’s Penal Code is an example of the kind of state statute we can expect more of if
the CDA is upheld.109 The New York statute adds a “harmful to minors” standard to the “indecency” standard used in
the CDA.110 The statute also provides an exception, similar
to the Supreme Court’s “SLAPS” test,111 for persons with scientific, educational, governmental, or other similar justification for possessing disseminating, or viewing the material.112
These two provisions of the New York statute adjust the focus of the law to material that is perhaps less deserving of
protection than the Pacifica definition of “indecency,” but,
108. See Peter Johnson, Pornography Drives Technology: Why Not to Censor the
Internet, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 217 (1996).
109. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20-24 (McKinney 1996).
110. Id. § 235.20(6) (McKinney 1996).
111. SLAPS is an acronym for Serious Literary, Artistic, Political, or Scientific merit. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Supreme Court has
held that a state obscenity offense must be limited to works which, taken as a
whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id.
112. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1966) (finding that a
court can take into consideration the setting in which the publication was presented “as an aid to determining the question of obscenity”).
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because of its focus on minors rather than the general population, does not reach the level of obscenity. New York’s
community standard for determining what is suitable for
minors is the “adult community as a whole.”113 The New
York statute also has a provision criminalizing the use of the
Internet to importune, invite, or induce a minor to engage in
sexual activity.114 Because this prohibition is specific and not
tied to merely publishing material protected by the First
Amendment, it could be severed from the remainder of the
statute and survive scrutiny. Accordingly, even if the CDA
were to be struck down, at least part of the New York statute
has a chance of surviving.
Attempting to censor the Internet is a monumental challenge; it may be impossible to accomplish. Censoring the
Internet without trampling the First Amendment adds another dimension to the problem. When all is said and done,
the ultimate solution will be to recognize the Internet for
what it is: an unparalleled educational resource,115 the most
participatory marketplace of mass speech that the world has
yet seen,116 and an opportunity for diverse, frank, and uplifting discussion about all aspects of human existence.117
At the heart of the First Amendment is the principle that
each person should decide the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence.118 Our political
system and cultural life rest upon this ideal. The Internet
has evolved as it has because it has been free of contentbased considerations.119 There is a time when, and a place
where, censorship must be replaced with our responsibility
113. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235-20(6)(a).
114. Id. at § 235-21(3).
115. Brief for the Appellants, Department of Justice, before the U. S. Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU, 96-511, at 14-15 (1997).
116. ACLU, 928 F. Supp. at 881.
117. See Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers: Cybersexual
Possibilities, 83 GEO. L.J. 1969 (1995).
118. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 881.
119. Id. at 877.
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as parents to raise our children to decide for themselves
what is right and what is wrong, and to make informed and
confident choices from among the waves of material that
will come crashing over them—today from the Internet and
tomorrow from sources we can hardly imagine.
Thank you.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Thank you very much, Dave. Now,
to shift our perspective a little and add to the complexity of
the issues, Preeta Bansal will talk about cyberspace, the
Internet, and the law of libel and the First Amendment.
MS. BANSAL: I thought I would just briefly sketch, in
outline form, some of the other areas in which the Internet is
affecting First Amendment jurisprudence.
In the last few years, we have heard a lot about cyberspace, cyberspace law, and the First Amendment. Several
scholars have suggested that the massive communicative
power of the Internet may lead to a paradigm shift in our
constitutional, statutory, and common law regimes affecting
speech and information dissemination.120 I would suggest
that this debate is premature and that the Internet should not
yet signal a paradigm shift in our legal regimes.
Every five or ten years—and in the last few years the frequency seems to have increased at an exponential rate—
when there is an advent of new technology, the Supreme
Court and lower courts grapple with how and whether existing legal rules can accommodate the challenges posed by the
new technology, or whether there need to be new legal rules
or new categories within those legal rules.121
120. See, e.g., David P. Miranda, Defamation in Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229 (1996); Eric Handelman, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current Onscenity Standard Provide Individuals with the Proper Consitutional Safeguards, 59 ALB. L. REV. 709 (1995); Stacey J.
Rappaport, Rules of the Road: The Constitutional Limits on Restricting Indecent
Speech on the Information Superhighway, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 301 (1995).
121. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
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For example, as recently as 1984, only thirteen years ago,
the Supreme Court dealt with the advent of what was then
the dramatic new technology of the video home recorder. In
the context of copyright in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,122 the Court considered how and whether
the judiciary should impose new legal rules to deal with new
technology.123 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority opinion in Sony in 1984, stated:
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology.
Indeed, it was the invention of the new form of copying equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to
the original need for copyright protection. Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this
country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned
the new rules that new technology made necessary. . . .
The judiciary’s reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance
is a recurring theme. Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated
by such new technology. In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such a calculus
of interests.124
(1984); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374
(1996).
122. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
123. Id. (considering whether traditional copyright law principles are applicable to videotape recorders).
124. Id. 430-31 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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Justice Stevens was, of course, talking about the copyright laws. But, just last year, in the Denver Area Telecommunications125 case, the Supreme Court considered the effect of
new technology, specifically cable television, on its traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. For what seemed to
me to be the first time in a very long time, several members
of the Court seemed willing to adopt a more ad hoc balancing approach and thus to gut the traditional categories and
rules that have marked the First Amendment jurisprudence
up to this day.126
Whether or not that is justified in the context of the Internet is something we will debate later in this panel, especially
in the context of the indecency provision. But, in the area of
defamation and libel, in particular, a gutting of traditional
First Amendment rules and common law rules for liability is
not required. That is not to say that the Internet will not
pose new challenges for the courts. Rather, the challenge
will be to try and fit traditional legal principles into the context of the Internet environment.
There are three areas on which I want to focus today.
These include areas in which the law will require some potential adjustment or rethinking of how the traditional First
Amendment rules of libel and defamation should apply to
the Internet. The first area addresses whether the rules governing libel or slander should apply to Internet-specific phenomena such as live chat rooms.
The second area concerns whether the actual malice
standard, which is a speech, or First Amendment, protective
standard,127 should have greater application to private plain125. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374
(1996).
126. Compare id. at 2377 (concluding that countervailing interests and other
forms of regulation provide an alternate basis for the Court’s holding) with supra
note 1 (explaining traditional First Amendment categorization of speech).
127. The actual malice standard, as set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), requires a plaintiff in a defamation action who is
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tiffs in the Internet environment than in the regular environment. This may be particularly true for two reasons.
First, private plaintiffs, as opposed to public figure plaintiffs
who traditionally get this protection,128 arguably have access, in the Internet environment, to effective means of
communication to counteract libelous utterances. Second,
private plaintiffs, if they participate in the chat rooms, have
arguably injected themselves into certain controversies.
Therefore, private plaintiffs may be more akin to limitedpurpose public figures.129
deemed to be a public figure or public official to prove that the defendant made
the defamatory statement with “actual malice,” defined as “knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.” Id. at 279-80. The public plaintiff is required to prove actual malice not merely by a preponderance of the evidence,
but with “clear and convincing clarity.” Id. at 285-86. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court summarized who will be considered
to be a public figure, and therefore, to whom the Sullivan standards will apply:
[The public figure] designation may rest on either of two alternative bases. In some instances an individual may achieve
such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an
individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
128. See id.; see also Contrina L. Counts & C. Amavera Merton, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083 (1996); Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Lawyer Defmamation: Putting the Horn Behind the Court, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3 (1958).
129. In the context of a defamation action, a limited purpose public figure is
“an individual who voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. A limited purpose public figure is also subject to
the Sullivan standard. See supra note 127 (explaining the Sullivan standard). See
also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 898 (1980) (deciding plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure where “he
was president of second largest cooperative in the country, was known as a leading advocate of certain precedent-breaking policies, was mover and shaper of
many of the cooperative’s controversial actions and made it a leader in unit pricing and open dating, and public controversies existed over viability of cooperatives as a form of commercial enterprise and over the wisdom of various policies
that the cooperative of which plaintiff was president was pioneering”); Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (deeming political lobbyists limited purpose
public figures); Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985) (deeming

498

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[7:463

The third area in which the Internet will challenge traditional rules is the liability of new actors who are created by
the Internet environment, particularly the online service
provider.130 Two recent cases, which I will discuss in detail
when I address this topic, have addressed the liability of
CompuServe131 and Prodigy,132 two online service providers.
These decisions may have repercussions on commercial and
noncommercial entities that actually disseminate the message, so to speak.
Let me quickly run through, in more detail, these three
areas and suggest an approach in which to look at each of
them.
The first issue is whether the categories of libel or slander
should apply to transitory online discussions. As the threejudge court in the ACLU case detailed in its extensive findings of fact, one of the unique features of the Internet is live,
or transitory, chat groups.133 In these online groups, a message is transmitted to a wide number of people, but is not
really stored in a computer’s memory. A message therefore
oftentimes has a very transitory existence.134 A chat group is
most akin to a live radio or television call-in show.
The issue, as I mentioned, is whether the rules of slander
or libel are more applicable in the Internet environment.
Under traditional common law principles, slander, in order
to be actionable, requires proof of special damages or actual
pecuniary loss by the plaintiff.135 Four categories of excepwrestling coach limited purpose public figure).
130. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995); see also Joseph M. Campollo, Childporn.GIF: Establishing Liability for Online
Service Providers, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 721 (1996).
131. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
132. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
133. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835.
134. Id.
135. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 112,
at 788 (5th ed. 1984).
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tions are considered slander per se, however, in which you
do not need to prove actual pecuniary loss, because the content of the statement is considered so horrendous.136 Examples of libel per se include the chastity of a woman, sexual
misconduct, or attributing loathsome diseases to the plaintiff.137
In libel, there is also a distinction between libel in which
you need not prove special damages, termed libel per se,
and libel in which you must prove special damages.138 In
the libel context, though, it does not matter what the content
of the communication is. Instead, if something is viewed as
defamatory on its face, whatever the content of that utterance, then you need not prove special damages.139
This traditional common law distinction between slander
and libel on the need to prove damages is based on the theory that written words are generally more permanent and
therefore have greater consequence, regardless of whether
there is actual loss to the plaintiff.140 In addition to greater
permanency, written words also are capable of wider circulation (which also inherently leads to greater harm), and are
viewed as the product of greater deliberation by the author.
For all of these reasons, there is less need to prove special
damages in the case of libel.
In the context of online chat rooms, the question arises as
to whether an individual’s message should be viewed as an
oral statement, in which the rules of slander should apply, or
as written words, in which the rules of libel should apply.
On the one hand, particularly when the online chat rooms
are not stored in the computer’s memory, the words are
transitory, and therefore more akin to slander. Unlike writ-

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, § 112, at 786.
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ten words that have a permanent value, the message immediate dissipates. Also, the words that people speak or write
in the context of an online chat room are arguably more
spontaneous. They do not have the same quality of deliberation that generally goes into the written word. Therefore,
you could argue that the more relaxed rules of slander
should apply.
On the other hand, one of the biggest arguments in favor
of applying the rule of libel to the Internet is that words that
are disseminated through the Internet, like written words,
are capable of broad circulation.141 So, unlike the spoken
word in which only a handful of people can hear you, in the
Internet environment, you have widespread dissemination,
which can lead to great potential harm. So, there is also an
argument that the rules of libel are more applicable to
speech on the Internet.
Not surprisingly, given how new this area of the law is,
there is no published case addressing the issue of whether
libel or slander is more applicable to Internet speech. Undoubtedly, courts will consider the different legal arguments. In my opinion, the existing framework and categorical distinctions between slander and libel can probably be
accommodated in the context of a particular factual situation
to address the issue.
The second area in which the Internet will challenge, or
potentially expand, First Amendment protection for a traditional libel or defamation claim is in the context of private
plaintiffs. For a public figure to prevail in a libel case against
a media defendant, he or she must prove that the defendant
acted with actual malice under the traditional standard set
forth in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.142 Actual malice in this context means either knowledge
141. See John Hielsher, Banks Gear up to Give AC Banking Another Turn,
SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Mar. 31, 1997, at 12.
142. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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that a statement is false or subjective awareness of its probable falsity.143 It is a pretty speech-protective standard, as it
is not enough for a defendant to have published a statement
that turns out to be false and defamatory through negligence
or without full investigation.144 If a newspaper runs something that turns out to be false, as long as it was not made
with actual knowledge of falsity or awareness of probable
falsity, the defendant would prevail when the plaintiff is a
public figure.145
In the private figure context, however, the rules are a little more relaxed. Although there is still no strict liability for
defamation under the First Amendment, it is a lesser standard of care—usually negligence in most states.146 A defendant may therefore be held liable to a private figure for negligently publishing a false and defamatory statement about
the private figure.147
The issue of whether there should be a greater or lesser
standard of care in the Internet arises for two reasons. First,
it is arguable that the private plaintiff, by entering a chat
room or otherwise posting words on the Internet, entered
into a realm of debate. It is analogous to the limited-purpose
public figure who enters the vortex of a public debate. There
is an argument that, like public figures, such private figures
have exposed themselves to a certain amount of attention.
The second, and in my opinion more important, reason is
that the private plaintiff in the Internet environment, like a
public figure in the traditional environment, arguably has
access to effective channels of communication to counteract
any false speech. The traditional rationale for having a more
relaxed standard of care for media defendants when a public

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 279-80.
See id.
See id.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, § 112, at 788.
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figure is involved is that a public figure has access to the
press; if a false statement is uttered about her, she can go to
the press and counteract false speech with more speech. A
private figure, on the other hand, does not usually have the
same access to effective channels of communication.
In the Internet environment, however, a private plaintiff
arguably has greater access than usual to communication. A
private plaintiff Internet user arguably can go back to the
same chat room or bulletin board and counteract bad speech
with more speech. So again, because of the greater dissemination of information that is capable on the Internet, higher
First Amendment standards should apply. Therefore, there
is less of a need to regulate potentially libelous statements.
The final area in which I think the First Amendment will
be affected by Internet technology in the libel context is the
liability of the online service provider. Two recent cases
reached opposite conclusions on this issue.148
Traditionally, liability for defamation attaches to not only
the author of a defamatory statement, but also the publisher,
the person who disseminates the information.149 A print
publisher, including a book publisher such as Random
House or Time Inc., is presumed to have the author’s
knowledge of a publication’s content.150 Thus, the same
knowledge is essentially attributed to the initial publisher as
to the author.151 The law imposes this presumptive knowledge, in part, to require that the entity publishing—the primary publisher—fully inspect the content of its publications.152
In contrast to the initial publisher, the distributor of print
material, such as a newsstand or bookstore, is liable for
148. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (1995).
149. KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, § 113, at 799-800.
150. See id. § 113, at 801.
151. See id.
152. See id.
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defamation only if it actually knows or has reason to know
of the defamatory content of the material.153 A presumption
of knowledge governs it154—a lower standard that derives
from the First Amendment. In the 1959 Supreme Court case
of Smith v. California,155 the Court held that a statute that imposed criminal liability on a book seller for selling an obscene book, even if the bookseller had no knowledge of the
book’s content, is prohibited under the First Amendment.156
The Court was concerned about the self-censorship that
would result if a book distributor or newsstand were forced
to inspect the contents of every single item on its shelves.157
Essentially, the issue in the Internet environment is
whether the online service provider should be viewed more
like an initial publisher, who has a duty to inspect the content of the statements that it publishes, or more like a book
distributor, who does not. Two recent cases came to differing conclusions on this issue.
The first case, Cubby v. Compuserve,158 was before the
Southern District of New York in 1991. In Cubby, the court
held that CompuServe acted more like a book distributor,
and consequently was not liable as a primary publisher and
had no First Amendment duty to inspect the content of
whatever was distributed.159
The second case was Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy,160
which was in the New York Supreme Court in 1995. That
case held that Prodigy, for a number of fact-specific, and I
would suggest erroneous, reasons, concluded that Prodigy
was more like the initial publisher and should have screened

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 135, § 113, at 799-800.
361 U.S. 147 (1959).
See id. at 155.
See id. at 153.
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id.
1995 WL 323710.
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the content of the material. Prodigy in fact claimed to have
screened the content of various materials, and so therefore
could be liable, just as the original author and the original
publisher.161
The Stratton Oakmont decision was essentially overruled
legislatively by the CDA, not by the indecency provisions,
but rather by the “Good Samaritan provision.”162 That provision, section 230(c), states that “no provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher
or speaker of information provided by another content provider.”163 This basically means that the Prodigys and
CompuServes of the world that publish information managed by an independent contractor (for example, the person
who runs the bulletin board) cannot be held liable as the initial publisher.
The issue that now arises under this provision is whether
this provision creates an absolute immunity from liability,
which most people seem to think was not intended. So, although the CDA now says that the Prodigys and CompuServes of the world should not be treated as print publishers,
the issue now is whether they can be held liable as book distributors. Under a literal reading of the new statutory provision, if CompuServe actually has notice or knowledge of defamatory material and continues to distribute the material, it
cannot be held liable. That clearly was not what was intended by section 230(c), but it will be interesting to see how
courts interpret it.
Overall, I think one of the most interesting areas that will
emerge from this, besides the liability of the online service
provider, is the liability of other new entities operating in the
Internet environment, especially managers of the bulletin
boards and independent contractors with whom the online
161. See id. at *4.
162. See id.; 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West Supp. 1996).
163. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1).
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service providers contract. It seems acceptable to have the
online service provider viewed as a book distributor, but
only if the law imposes the duty to inspect content upon an
entity other than the author. Absent some finding that
someone with a deeper pocket than the author is liable, we
will have a rough world ahead in which a lot of defamatory
utterances will probably be made with impunity.
MR. JOLLYMORE: We now go to the core topic of this
panel, the CDA and its provisions. I trust that Chris Hansen
will tell us why they are all unconstitutional.
MR. HANSEN: In order to talk about the ACLU v. Reno
case, the ACLU’s attack on the CDA, you must first discuss
the concept of indecency. As the first speaker, Mr. Pawlik,
suggested, we did not challenge the law against obscenity in
the context of cyberspace; we challenged indecency. In my
mind, there is a very simple way to understand the difference: obscenity is speech about sex that has no redeeming
social value,164 whereas indecency is speech about sex that
does in fact have redeeming social value.165 It is indecency,
not obscenity, that the CDA attempts to make a crime.166
Under the CDA, if you engage in speech about sex on the
Internet, even if that speech is valuable speech (at least for
adults), you can go to jail for up to two years.167 That law
applies not only to the media conglomerates to which we
have previously applied indecency law, including the television and cable networks, but also to every single American
who sends an e-mail message to her friends168 or who communicates through a news group169 or in a chat room.170 It
164. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
165. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746.
166. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (b), (d) (West Supp. 1996).
167. See id. § 223(a), (d).
168. The term e-mail refers to electronic mail, which comprises messages
sent from computer to computer via the Internet. See G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 332 (1995); see also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
169. The term news group refers to a bulletin board style discussion group
that is operated over the Internet. See ALLISON, supra note 168, at 336; see also
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applies not just to the Web; it applies to all of the communicative aspects of the Internet, as well as to all of the display
aspects of the Internet.171
There are two huge difficulties with the CDA that have
led six federal judges unanimously to hold it unconstitutional.172 The first problem is that speakers cannot comply
with the law. The CDA makes it a crime if you speak in such
a way that it can be heard by someone under the age of
eighteen.173 For any of you who have been on the Internet,
you know that it is not possible to determine whether the
people reading your speech are over or under the age of
eighteen. Well, if you are a Web site operator, or if you are
posting a message on a news group or engaging in speech in
a chat room, there is literally no way for you to know
whether the person who is reading your message is over or
under eighteen.
As a result, you cannot speak in so-called indecent
words, you cannot speak about so-called indecent concepts,
and you cannot engage in adult, socially valuable, constitutionally-protected speech on the Internet. All of us would
have to take our speech on the Internet down to the level
deemed suitable for the most vulnerable minors in the most
conservative county in this country. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that we cannot suppress adult speech in the
guise of protecting children,174 and that is precisely what the
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834-35. Bulletin board services provide Internet access
and allow individuals to communicate and exchange information. ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 833.
170. Chat rooms are services offered by commercial Internet-access providers where users can interact with each other by text in real time. ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 835.
171. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d).
172. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883 (finding that the CDA violates the First
Amendment and enjoining its enforcement); Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 950 (agreeing
with the ACLU court that section 233(d) of the CDA is unconstitutional).
173. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (b), (d).
174. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (reversing defendant’s
conviction for violating Michigan obscene literature statute, holding that Michigan statute, which made it an offense to make available to general reading public
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CDA attempts to do.
Now, let me give you some idea of the CDA’s consequences by talking about some of the clients I represent in
that case. As you heard, the ACLU filed a suit on the date
the law was signed.175 Approximately three weeks later, the
ACLU was joined by the American Library Association,
along with the entire Internet industry—CompuServe, Prodigy, Microsoft, AOL, and so on.176 But I think it is most useful to talk about the kinds of people that I represent in the
ACLU case.
I represent the ACLU itself. The ACLU has a Web site on
which it posts a copy of the “seven dirty words” case discussed earlier.177 It is available to anyone who wants to see
it. The Supreme Court has already found that the monologue in that case, which is attached to the decision, is indecent.178 The ACLU, therefore, by putting up a Supreme
Court decision, risks going to jail under the CDA.
a book having a potentially deleterious influence on youth, violates due process
clause by restricting freedom of speech and effectively reducing adult population
to reading only what is fit for children); Sable Communications of California, Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (explaining its prohibition of government from banning the dissemination of indecent material to adults, while simultaneously acknowledging the government’s compelling interest in protecting children from
pornographic material, by stating, “the government may not reduce the adult
population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children”); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968) (establishing that “because children generally do not possess the
same capacity as adults to make informed choices about whether to view indecent material, and because the speech may have deep and harmful effects on
children that cannot readily be undone, there is no First Amendment right to
distribute indecent material to children.”); id. (“The government regulation that
prohibits the dissemination of indecent material to children, while not prohibiting dissemination to adults, is fully consistent with the First Amendment.”). See
Brief for Appellant at 20, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96511).
175. The ACLU filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the CDA, and
President Clinton signed the CDA into law, on February 8, 1996.
176. For a comprehensive list of organizations who joined the ACLU as
plaintiffs in their challenge to the CDA, see ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827-28.
177. ACLU, ACLU, American Civil Liberties Union, Freedom Network (visited
Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org>.
178. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741.
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Similarly, I represent Human Rights Watch.179 Human
Rights Watch puts up its reports on human rights abuses all
over the world.180 Some of those reports contain descriptions of sexual torture and sexual abuse that are quite horrifying, quite graphic, and quite extreme.181 That speech is potentially criminal under the CDA.
I also represent Planned Parenthood and a series of other
groups that put up on their Web sites speech involving safer
sex practices.182 For example, I represent the Critical Path
AIDS Web page that is run by a single guy in Philadelphia.183 He puts up a huge amount of information on his
Web site about safer sex practices. He does it for a couple of
reasons. He does it because he wants to prevent the transmission of AIDS and he wants to prevent people from getting death-causing diseases.184 In posting the information on
his Web site, he sometimes uses the street names for various
sexual practices and sexual organs, because in his view it is
extremely important for adults—and, for that matter, for
teen-agers as well—to know what works and what does not
work. If you post it using the Latinate terms for the various
sexual practices and organs, not everyone will understand
what you are trying to convey. He puts that kind of information on his Web site, which could result in his arrest and
imprisonment under the CDA.

179. The Human Rights Watch conducts regular investigations of human
rights abuses in approximately seventy countries around the world. Human
Rights Watch, About Human Rights Watch (visited Apr. 20, 1997)
<http://www.hrw.org/about/ about.html>. The organization “addresses the
human rights practices of governments of all political stripes, geo-political
alignments, and of all ethnic and religious persuasions.” Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Planned parenthood web cite.
183. Critical Path AIDS Project, The Critical Path World Wide Web site (visited
Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.critpath.org>.
184. See Critical Path AIDS Project, AIDS Prevention (visited Apr. 16, 1997)
<http://www.critpath.org/prevent.htm>.
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I represent Wildcat Press,185 which is a publisher of gay
and lesbian literature, largely fiction. Wildcat Press has a
discussion area called “Youth Art News,” a forum in which
gay and lesbian teenagers can post poetry, artwork, and fiction, as well as nonfiction, about what it is to discover as a
teenager that you are gay or lesbian, and what it is to deal
with the kinds of feelings that affect you as you go through
that process. They put that up not only because it is beneficial to the speakers—the kids who are putting up the information—but also because it is enormously useful, for example, for the one gay kid in Boise, Idaho, who has never met
anyone else whom he knows is gay and who needs to make
contact with other people to deal with his feelings. Under
the CDA, the kids posting this material could potentially go
to jail.
Now, based on what we have been doing in court, Ted
may respond that I am exaggerating the dangers here—that
is, the risk of people who might go to jail. However, remember that indecency is speech that is about sex but that
has social value. If indecency does not include material like
this, then I do not know what it includes. At a time when
states and school boards are passing laws trying to take
rights away from gay people and the Clinton Administration
is trying to prevent gay people in the military from even saying out loud, “I’m gay,” to suggest that no one is going to
find speech about being gay patently offensive seems to me
hopelessly naive. I certainly do not feel comfort, and nor
should anyone, at the thought that I might have to go to
prison for engaging in that kind of speech.
The other negative result of the CDA is its effect on the
Internet. As you know, the Internet contains a variety of different aspects, many of which are simple communication
back and forth, including, for example, a news group, a chat
185. Wildcat Press, Gay Wired-Wildcat Press, The Wildcat Press World Wide
Web site (visited Apr. 17, 1997) <http://www.gaywired.com/~unity/wildcat>.
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room, a mail exploder,186 and a list server.187 All of these are
methods by which we engage in conversation on the Internet. Because it is literally impossible to engage in age verification in any of these kinds of aspects, either people must
use purely child-friendly speech, or we are simply going to
drive all speech of that kind out of the Internet. We are going to reduce the Internet from what it has been: an incredibly empowering medium; a medium that gives me the same
power to speak as Ted Turner or as Time Inc., a power that
none of us has ever had in human history—the power for
each individual to speak to every other individual around
the globe. If the CDA is allowed to go into effect, either we
are all going to be driven out of the Internet or we are going
to have to censor our speech on this medium. Each and
every one of us will have to be careful every time we open
our mouths—that is, every time we go to our computers.
If put into effect, the CDA could well force the Internet to
become much more like traditional broadcast media. Instead of many people speaking to many people, the CDA
could force the Internet to be a medium where only big corporations can afford to screen their speech or to find out
whether people coming to their site are minors. The CDA
would have a potentially disastrous effect on the really
wonderful qualities that have led the Internet to flourish.
The CDA is not the only statute addressing the Internet.
I would like to talk about two others very briefly. One, the
New York statute, has been referred to.188 New York tries to
do similar things as the CDA, with slightly different wrinkles, but it has all the same vices of the CDA.
186. The term “mail exploder” refers to automatic mailing list services that
allow communication via e-mail about particular topics of interest to subscribers.
See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927.
187. The term “listserve” refers to a particular brand of mail exploder. See
supra note 186; Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927. Listservs are mailing list services that
“allow communication about particular subjects of interest to a group of people.”
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
188. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00 (McKinney 1996).
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There are other laws in Georgia, which the ACLU has
also challenged:189 one that prohibits anonymous speech on
the Internet190 and another that prohibits the use of trademarks on the Internet in such a way that it might imply that
you have permission to use the trademark.191 Any of you
who have an e-mail address understand how much prohibiting anonymous speech on the Internet would change the
habits of the Internet.
More troubling, however, is that the New York and the
Georgia laws are both state efforts to regulate the Internet.
State law regulation of the Internet presents huge problems
under the Commerce Clause,192 an issue that has not yet
been fully litigated, but is being litigated in those two cases.
How do we allow each of the fifty states to regulate what is
essentially a global medium? If you have a Web site on the
Internet, you can be found guilty in Georgia for one thing
and in Alabama for the opposite thing. How can you possibly change your Web site in such a way that you are accommodating conflicting laws of different states? The short
answer is that you cannot. State regulation of the Internet
presents very serious Commerce Clause problems, which I
suspect may be one of the next big areas of law that we must
address concerning the Internet.
The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear argument on the
CDA case on March 19 and should come to a decision by the
end of this Term, roughly the end of June.193 Thus, if we get
together again, we can talk about the enormous way in
189. See ACLU v. Miller, No. 96-2475 (N.D. Ga. filed Sept. 23, 1996).
190. See GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-3 (1996). For an excellent discussion of anonymity in cyberspace, see Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymity and International Law
Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231 (1996).
191. See id. § 16-9-93.1.
192. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
193. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 19, 1997. ACLU v.
Reno:
A
Chronology
(visited
June
9,
1997)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/n050896.htm/>. For a transcript of the oral argument, see 1997 WL 136253.
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which the Supreme Court protected free speech on the
Internet.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Thank you very much, Chris. Ted
Hirt, do you have a few things to add to that?
MR. HIRT: Like Chris, I too will try to be brief and just
hit the high points of the government’s defense of the CDA.
I want to thank the IPLJ and Fordham Law School for
their invitation. My principal caveat is that I do not purport
to be an official spokesperson for the Department, so the
views I express here today are my own, though, hopefully,
they will coincide with the government’s position in this
case.
I want to talk briefly about the CDA and the government’s defense of it. I will also make a few observations on
the CDA’s implications for regulation of the Internet generally.
I cannot resist starting with the vagueness challenge194
that has been made against the CDA because the interesting
thing is that, while I do not like to do head counting, there
was a case that we should mention because it is in the “four
corners” of this judicial district, called Shea v. Reno.195 In
Shea, a three-judge court, following the Philadelphia Court’s
decision in ACLU, struck down the CDA.196 What is interesting about that decision is that all three judges, in contrast
to two of the three Philadelphia judges, did not have trouble
with the textual term “indecency” in terms of the vagueness
issues raised by Mr. Hansen and his colleagues.197
The Shea court pointed out that the Conference Report
that led to the enactment of the CDA was very clear. The
194. The vagueness issue refers to the alleged vagueness in the meaning of
“indecency” as used in the CDA. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (d).
195. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3323
(1996) (No. 96-595).
196. See id. at 950.
197. See id. at 935-38.

1997]

SYMPOSIUM⎯CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CDA

513

report showed that Congress was using the definition of indecency that came out of a body of precedent, judicial and
administrative, including the FCC. 198 So, for Mr. Hansen to
say that “socially redeeming” Web sites will be attacked as a
result of the CDA is not really the accurate story if you compare the Web sites of his plaintiffs with the Conference Report and FCC rulings that they cite.
In re King Broadcasting Co.199 is one of the FCC rulings
cited by the Shea court. In that case, the FCC decided to take
no action in response to a complaint about a broadcast
show—I believe it was on television—that involved frank
discussions of teenage sexuality and had explicit language.200 I do not know if the material was as explicit as that
on the Critical Path AIDS Web page noted by Mr. Hansen,
but I also do not know that it would be meaningfully different. The Shea court essentially said, “Look, this is what Congress said, and this is what the government has represented,
and we think that people can consult these bodies of precedents.”201
Some of the interesting things about the Internet include,
of course, what everyone talks about: its decentralization,
that is, its lack of central control, and its twenty-four-hour-aday availability. What people do not say, however, is that it
will be ubiquitous or pervasive, because if they said that,
then the logical corollary of this expansive syllogism brings
us four-square into the very language of Pacifica, which emphasized the pervasiveness of broadcast media in upholding
the challenged restriction of “indecent” speech.202
198. See 142 CONG. REC. H1129 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (introducing Conference Committee Report on the Communications Decency Act) (“The conferees
intend that the term indecency (and the rendition of the definition of that term in
new section 502) has the same meaning as established in . . . Sable Communications
of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).”).
199. 5 F.C.C.R. 2971 (1990).
200. Id.
201. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 938.
202. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
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It is ironic in the cable context that cable, as you may
know, really grew up largely from nowhere in response to
geographic concerns about the carriage of TV signals. Then
we had the 1984 Cable Act,203 and by 1992, when the “mustcarry” part of the 1992 statute204 was challenged,205 cable was
starting to penetrate sixty to sixty-five percent of households. As the first speaker, Mr. Pawlik, indicated, the Playboy court,206 which dealt with cable scrambling of adult entertainment, pointed out that cable TV is, in a sense, as
pervasive as former traditional broadcast.207 The Denver
Area case comes close to saying that as well.208
I am not arguing that there is a computer in every household, but we know the trends of both demographics and
education, and I think it is clear—I do not hear anyone disputing—that at least Congress, in representing the public interest, has a legitimate, if not compelling, interest in trying to
regulate the access of children to indecency—or what I will
call pornography.
So, if we start with the notion that there is a problem with
indecent speech on the Web, then we hear that the problem
is so vast, so uncontrollable, and so uncontainable, that the
government can do nothing about it. But I do not think that
is the way to look at how to deal with the problem—one that
is visible, apparent, and has not gone away. Everything that
we have seen shows that while private industry tries to use
blocking mechanisms and tries to sell software, we always
have the problem—which is true in any medium—that you
203. Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (West Supp. 1996)).
204. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
205. See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
206. Playboy Entert. Group, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del.
1996).
207. Id. at 786-87.
208. See Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (1996).
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have parents who are unwilling, unable, or ignorant of how
to put a lock on a cable box, how to take the remote control
away, or how to program a computer. So, we are always going to have the “catch-up” problems of the private sector trying to regulate.
At the same time, people say that indecent speech cannot
be regulated by the government, but then tell us that, somehow, the private sector will regulate it for us. So, I think
there are some internal contradictions to some of the arguments made by the opponents of the CDA.
If we start with the premises that there is a problem and
that the government can do something about it, then we turn
to the practical problem: can the government do something
about it in some meaningful, effective way?
I think it is interesting, in terms of the applications on the
Internet, that Senator Exon and the other sponsors were really looking at what they identified as a very discrete problem.
They were saying that computer bulletin boards and Web
sites were being used by commercial pornographers, with
their profits in mind, to purvey pornography, and that it was
accessible to children.209 Putting up a warning on the first
page of your home page saying, “Warning: You must be
twenty-one to enter” is sort of an attractive nuisance.
What is interesting about the CDA is that what you see
today in the real world is that the commercial pornographers
do in fact have adult identification systems. One of the affirmative defenses, obviously, under the CDA’s section
223(e)(5)(b),210 is the availability of adult identification or
some sort of credit card or other type of check. So, ironically, the CDA can be extremely effective as a defense for the
very pornographers to whom it was directed.

209. 141 CONG. REC. S8089-8090 (daily ed. June 9, 1995); 141 CONG. REC.
S8333 (daily ed. June 14, 1995).
210. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(b).
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To some extent, I think that the plaintiffs and we are “two
ships crossing in the night.” I do not know if that has been
said in public before, but we have often said it to ourselves,
because there are people, such as those represented by Mr.
Hansen, who are very concerned about this particular issue.
While I am not discounting their concern, when you look at
what Congress was trying to do, you see that Congress was
looking at an entirely different aspect of the Internet.
Mr. Hansen says that these two are going to get hopelessly enmeshed. I think that the vagueness issue, which I
have addressed, tries to separate that out. If you have a clear
body of precedent, you are not going to have a situation
where the pornographers are going to be ignored and Mr.
Hansen’s clients somehow are going to come under investigatory agency oversight in terms of prosecutions under the
CDA.
But the second issue, which Mr. Hansen has pointed out,
is how do you regulate this? I think we have pointed out
that the commercial pornographers have a way of doing it,
and they can do it. And, as the Solicitor General’s brief in
the Supreme Court points out,211 if commercial users of the
Internet can find ways to channel speech so that adults, but
not children, can speak, then there is no reason why nonprofit organizations cannot do that. There is no reason why
they cannot have adult verification systems.
It is true that you cannot really verify anything over the
Internet, per se, though recent electronic commerce is doing
that with credit cards. But with computer bulletin board
systems, as the United States v. Thomas212 case indicated,
there are a lot of situations in which you call back, you send
a driver’s license, or you send some age identifier or other
verifier, allowing the sender to restrict transmissions by
211. Brief for Appellant at 10, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (No. 96-511).
212. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
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age.213
So, I think that when we say things like, “we cannot regulate it,” “it is too big a problem,” and “you will have foreign
sites,” public policymakers should look at these arguments.
But when Congress looks at the problem as it does and says,
“This is a medium. We are looking at it. We recognize the
First Amendment implications. Here is how we think we
can resolve these competing concerns,” I think that Congress
in fact should be given deference in that respect.
Thank you.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Thank you very much, Ted. The last
word, except for questions and answers, belongs to Parry
Aftab.
MS. AFTAB: I will keep this short. Let me give you a
slightly different perspective. How many of you have Internet accounts through an online service like AOL? Just about
all of you. You understand that you cannot get to Web sites
unless you have an address for the Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”),214 or you do a search using one of the search
engines215 or other mechanisms for finding one site that will
lead you there. If any of you have been searching for par213. In Thomas, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a federal obscenity conviction,
holding that the intangible form of a computer bulletin board did not preclude
prosecution for interstate transportation of lewd materials. 74 F.3d at 705.
There, a federal postal inspector investigating a complaint about the Thomas
computer site mailed an application form and $55 fee to the site. Id. Defendant
then gave the agent a password which would allow him to access the site. Id.
214. URL is the addressing format used to identify specific Internet locations. ALLISON, supra note 168, at 339.
215. According to one commentator:
Search engines typically disperse Web crawlers to scour the network
and compile an index of existing documents. These agents note
changes within existing documents and update the index, which is
stored in the search-engine hardware’s RAM. . . . The deeper the
crawler goes and the more elegantly the index cross-references, the
more relevant results will be.
Jim Balderston, Search Engine Vendors eye Intra nets: Tech Update Intranets Mean
that search tools must be fine-tuned for Corporate needs, INFOWORLD, July 1, 1996, at
41.
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ticular sites and have had problems finding them, you know
that it is not always easy to find Web sites.
When marketing a Web site on the Net, commercial sites
are looking for hits—that is, the number of people who visit
them— so that they can get outside advertisements.216 Our
Web site has about 10,000 regular visitors every month, and
those numbers are important to us.
There are a lot of Web masters, people who design Web
sites.217 They want to increase the traffic so that they can
say, “I had 20,000 hits last month,” or “I had 50,000 hits last
month,” and “therefore, I am entitled to this much in advertisement revenue.” To accomplish this, they hide text in
what is called metatext.218 When you pull up a Web site,
there are things that you do not see. Sometimes, if you have
ever seen something printed out, you see all these little carets around certain language. That is coding, the way WordPerfect would code certain things to tell the computer to indent text, to put in certain punctuation, or to do certain
things with sizing. Metatext is invisible to the viewer, but it
is very visible to the Web spiders and the search engines that
go around, scour the Net, and pick up the first twenty-five
or fifty words off of every Web site because they look for key
words.219
216. Kodak, for example, judged the success of its Web site, in part, by the
40,000 software files that were downloaded from its site in the first quarter of
1996. William Patalon III, Grass Roots Effort to Create Kodak’s Internet Home Page
Proves Successful, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, July 24, 1996, at S12.
217. “Web master” is a term that may encompass a number of different responsibilities, including building and running a company’s web site, “responding to e-mail from customers, fixing technical glitches in a Web site, or writing
and editing copy for the site.” S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13, 1997, at B1. Although Web
masters are not nationally certified, there is a movement for national standards
currently underway. Id. However, there is no agreement, even among members
of the Webmaster’s Guild, as to what a Web master actually is. Id.
218. Metatext is the internal code in a computer program that contains formatting instructions. Guide to the World of Multimedia, Part IA: Roundup of CD
Formats, NEW MEDIA AGE, June 22, 1995, at 11.
219. In terms of marketing:
[w]hen the information search itself becomes the primary focus [of data
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People who are trying to market their site will put the
word “sex” into the metatext.220 The more times you use it,
the higher your number of hits, so that when people are
looking for a lot of traffic and they go into Alta Vista,221 or
any of the other Web site search engines and they type in
“sex,” their site is going to come up. Our site comes up
when you type “sex” because we talk about sexual harassment and sex discrimination in our legal site. I do not know
if that is part of the reason we get 10,000 hits a month, but I
would like to think it is not.
You have to understand how the Net really works.
Those of us who have been on the Net for a long time (and
therefore have no life and are proud of the fact that we are
geeks) have a lot of problems with censorship because a lot
of the people who are trying to censor, regulate, or moderate
activity on the Internet are people who do not understand
how it works.
We talk about PICS and various filtering software. There
are a lot of different ways of filtering what kids, or anyone
else, is seeing on the Internet. Some of the filtering mechanisms use search words.222 Others scour the Net and find offensive sites, or inoffensive sites, which is really what they
are doing now, because it is a lot easier to find the ones that
upon which business decisions can be based], messages . . . are replaced
by codes or metatexts. Under the impact of marketing discourse, one
salient code or metatext is the ‘consumer orientation’ . . . [utilized so
that] the market can be used as a justification for internal decisions.
Lars T. Christenson, Buffering Organization Identity in the Marketing Culture, EUR.
GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL STUD., Sept. 22, 1995, at 651.
220. See Dan Gillmor, Policing a Few Bad Apples Could Cut Into Internet Freedoms for All, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at 15; Marc Perton, Netting the
Right Fish, ASIA, INC., June 1996, at 56.
221. Alta Vista Technology Inc., The Alta Vista Technology Inc. (visited Apr.
16, 1996) <http://www.alta.vista.com>.
222. Search words are terms or key words that are used by a search engine
to locate sites on a particular topic. Useful Strategies for Teachers Going Online,
DOMINION, May 27, 1996, at 22 [hereinafter Useful Strategies]; ACLU, 929 F. Supp
at 836-37. In effect, “[t]he search engine ‘crawls’ the Web finding sites containing
the words.” Useful Strategies, supra, at 22.
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are clean under someone’s standards, then to find the ones
that are not.223
My problem is that when people are trying to regulate
these, they really do not know what they are doing. PICS
may be the way to go for the future on a lot of these things.
But when you look to the Internet, you need to recognize
that we are not New York City, New York State, or even the
United States. The Internet is a very global network; it is
global communication.
When we talk about the First Amendment, we are focusing on the United States. When we talk about community
standards, we are focusing on a community within the
United States, however we structure that. As Americans, we
tend to think that the world revolves around our standards
and our law. It does not. For example, when a neo-Nazi
puts something on a site in Illinois, which may be incredibly
offensive to most of us, it is protected speech within the
United States.224 When that Web site can be accessed by
someone in Germany, that same text would be deemed
criminal because of neo-Nazi criminal laws. If that person is
aware of that the German prosecutors are looking for him,
he will not go to Germany; if he goes to Denmark, however,
223. For example, Surf Watch, a leader in content filtering software, “lets
parents, teachers and employers block unwanted sexually explicit and other material from their computers’ Internet access—without restricting the access rights
of other Internet users.” Surf Watch Content Filtering Software from Spyglass Included in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer Starter Kit, PR NEWSWIRE ASS’N, Oct. 15,
1996; see also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 841-42.
224. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (invalidating Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act that made advocating violence as a means of political reform
a criminal act). In Brandenburg, the Court upheld the right of a Ku Klux Klan
member to speak out at a Klan rally, disregarding the racially offensive content
of his speech. Id. The Court also overruled Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927), in which the Court had previously held that a state may outlaw advocating violent means to effect political and economic change. Brandenburg, 395 U.S.
at 449. The Court rested its decision on the “principle that the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to [and likely to produce] imminent lawless action.” Id. at 447.
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he may be extradited to Germany because of a DanishGerman treaty concerning neo-Nazi criminals. Unanticipated consequences? Certainly. Who would anticipate that
someone who does something in Illinois can get arrested in
Germany just because the world does not see things the way
we do.225
So, we can talk about First Amendment all we want, but
we must understand that there are global standards and
there are substantial jurisdictional issues: district court
judges in this country are saying, “You have a Web site?
Gotcha in Connecticut.” It is a presence, a nexus, and they
can sue you here.226 And judges around the country, because of their general lack of understanding of cyberspace,
are saying the same thing. They are saying that you have to
be very cautious about what you are saying, even without
considering the legal effects of the CDA.227 You have to look
at what you are saying and look at world standards.
Just as background, let me explain about privacy on the

225. An American attorney working in Frankfurt, Germany, who is very
familiar with German cyberspace issues noted: “The Internet created a universal
jurisdiction, so that once you are on the Internet you are subject to the laws of
every country in the world.” German Student Faces Charges Over Internet Site,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1997, at 11D. For an example of a present day
example of the previous scenario, see id. In Germany, a 25 year-old German university student faced criminal charges for creating an Internet home page providing an electronic link to a left-wing newspaper which, among other things,
offered terrorism advice. Id.
226. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996). In Inset, a Connecticut corporation brought trademark infringement action
against Massachusetts corporation that allegedly used its trademark as an Internet domain name. Id. at 161. In denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, the District Court, Covello, J., held
that: (1) foreign corporation’s advertising via the Internet was solicitation of sufficient repetitive nature to satisfy “solicitation of business” provision of Connecticut long-arm statute; (2) foreign corporation had sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to support exercise of personal jurisdiction; and (3)
foreign corporation was, for venue purposes, deemed to reside in Connecticut.
Id.
227. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223; see, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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Net. The Electronic Frontier Foundation is a very good Web
site.228 If you are looking for a URL that will give you a lot
of information on censorship issues on the Net, you should
access it at <www.eff.org>. It will help you understand the
tensions between privacy and free speech.
One of the mechanisms suggested in the CDA is that
Webhosts screen visitors to their site to ensure that minors
do not have access to “indecent” material.229 It contemplates
adult identification cards or use of a credit card, as indicia of
majority. Registering, or giving credit card information for
access to certain sites, involves giving up information about
yourself to a lot of people out there whom you might not
want to have that information. The Web is an unlimited
source of information about demographics which can deprive many visitors of privacy rights, as it is. A lot of us on
the Net, knowing how much information can be derived
from reversed domain and other identification programs
used at many sites, are very careful about the kind of statistics we glean from people who access our sites.
So, you have this tension. It is easy to say, “Sure; register; put in your credit card information; forget security and
encryption issues for the time being; register and we will
know who you are, and we will be able to check it and know
how many times you hit this site that somebody else might
think is indecent.” Where you go with “Big Brother” information is all part of what people who are concerned in the
Net community are worried about. Using information obtained from the Electronic Frontier Foundation lets us see
what the world is doing to censor or regulate certain speech
or access to such speech on the Net. Canada’s Attorney General said he wanted to figure out how to censor the Net because he was concerned about “hate Web sites” and “white

228. Electronic
Fromtier
Foundation,
(visited
<http://www.eff.org/ pub/censorship/online_services>.
229. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223.

Apr.

20,

1997)
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power Web sites.”230 Germany just blocked an entire online
service because a large Netherlands service, similar to AOL
or Compuserve, provided access to one Web site that the
German government considered offensive. The Netherlands’ online service provider refused to censor the site.231
So, the German government blocked access to this Netherlands service in its country.232
Where are we going with country by country standards
and censorship? In Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and mainland
China, everything runs through government servers which
screen what is deemed appropriate for Webbers located in
that country.
What is going to happen next to information on the Net
on a global basis? Once we get past what is decent or indecent in the United States, and what is obscene or not obscene
in the United States, we need to understand that there is
speech that may be protected under any of our standards in
the United States that may be criminal someplace else in the
world.
So, what I am doing is not in any way capping the analysis by review of the CDA.233 I want you to be aware of the
expansiveness of communication on the Internet and the
ramifications of putting something on your Web site, of
sending something by e-mail to someone, and of accessing someone else’s Web site. And I want you to understand
how global all of these legal issues are—jurisdictional, privacy, free speech, criminal—whether you are talking about
minimum contacts, constitutional issues, state constitution,
federal Constitution. These are the tensions that we have to
balance, both in the United States and around the world.
230. See generally White Supremacy, Hatewatch (visited Apr. 20, 1997)
<http:// hatewatch.org>.
231. Electronic
Frontier
Foundation
(visited
Apr.
20,
1997)
<http://www.eff.org/ pub/censorship/online_services>.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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So, when you come down either in favor of against the
CDA, or the state equivalents of the DCS,234 as they may be
adopted from time to time, you need to examine those standards in a global setting. I am a cyberlaw practitioner. I see
cyberlaw globally and I want you to understand these issues
and see them globally as well.
When regulating the Net, do you use the standards that
are being used for every other media?235 Do you use the
standards that have developed over the last 200 years in this
country, or do you create a new standard because of the
unique nature of the Internet media?
What we are talking about is creating a different standard for certain communication than you have elsewhere
under the law. The problem is that the best thing about the
Net is also the worst thing about the Net: we are all one
gender, we are all one age, none of us are disabled, we are as
smart as we are, as articulate as we are. Right now, the
common language on the Internet is English;236 we all speak
English. We are anonymous.
With a first name like “Parry,” most of the people in the
world think I am a man, and I get a lot of e-mail saying
things like, “It is great that you are doing this. Those women
. . . .” I have to point these people to my Website and my
photo so that they understand.
But, as I said, the beauty of the Web is also the biggest
problem that we are facing. For example, how much can
you believe from an anonymous communication? A fortyseven-year-old guy in Ohio said he was a fifteen-year-old
boy who was very interested in this twelve-year-old girl.237
234. NEED TO CALL AFTAB AND FIND OUT WHAT THIS IS. DEP’T OF CIVIL SERVICES
OR DEP’T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES?

235. For an explanation of the different media standards, see supra note 1.
236. Candee Wilde, Industry Moving to Multilingual Internet, COMMS. WK.
INT’L, Mar. 4, 1996, at 22.
237. See Internet Seductions and Statutory Rape, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Feb.
16, 1997, at 10B.
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Who really knows? If you read profiles on AOL, you will
understand that it is the best fiction you have ever read.
People on the Net can reinvent themselves, merely by saying
they are what they had always hoped they would be.238
But understand that when you enter the Web, you have
gone “through the looking glass,” notwithstanding that often
regular laws will apply in cyberspace as well as in regular
space. A crime perpetrated in cyberspace is no less a crime;
it only uses a new medium.
But before everyone starts regulating or running to find a
new way of regulating the Net to make it safe for the world,
I want you to recognize the tension between what should be
done and what is doable. Before we censor, let us ask ourselves what alternative we have. Is there filtering and blocking software? Yes.239 Are there ways to regulate certain activity on the Web? Sure. Is it going to get there during my
lifetime? That depends on how long I live. But I want you
to recognize that all of these exist. As law students, as future
lawyers, and as practicing lawyers, we need to search for
balance. We must see it as a global issue. Do not see us as
Americans, or New Yorkers, or New York City people, or as
law students. Just see it far more globally and understand
that that is what you are facing. It will take more creativity
and a broader understanding of legal and social issues. We
will be expected to pull it all together, and know far more
than we have ever known before. We will need to build
global, cross-disciplinary teams of computer technology experts, online service providers, defamation and media legal
experts, constitutional law and international law experts,
and teams of these experts from around the world.
When you face free speech on the Internet, you face all of
238. Rosie Mestel, Long Distance Cyberporn in Memphis, TN, NEW SCI., Aug.
14, 1994, at S1.
239. See, e.g., supra note 223 (discussing SurfWatch, one type of filtering and
blocking software).
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these issues that are policy and practical issues, and we are
going to try to grapple with how to take all of the jurisprudence that we have brought to the world and find a way of
keeping them in balance to allow this incredible medium to
enrich our lives and the lives of generations to come.
Thank you.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Now we would like to take a few
questions.
QUESTION: This question is for Mr. Hirt or Ms. Aftab.
The Shea decision contained a footnote that lumped together
content that is transmitted with content that is simply made
available on the Internet.240 Is there any problem with this
lumping together of what essentially seem to be two different kinds of Internet content, the transmitted type and the
made-available type?
MR. HIRT: I will try to take a stab at the question.
The statute does have textual differences in terms of A’s
transmitting to B as opposed to A’s displaying and therefore
making available to B through an infinite number people.241
The so-called display provision, section 223(d)(1)(B), was enjoined.242 But the courts did—the Philadelphia court in particular—243 because it had problems with the term “indecent” as used in 223(a), and so it also enjoined that
provision.244
The Solicitor General’s brief says that it is one thing to
look at D and find problems with the displaying of content,
but where you are intentionally sending content directly
from A to B, especially if you know that B is under eighteen,

240. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 925 n.2 (“We use the term ‘content’ to refer to any
text, data, sound, program, or visual image transmitted over or made available
for retrieval on an interactive computer service.”).
241. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B), 223(d)(1)(A).
242. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d).
243. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 828.
244. Id. at 883.
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that is a different issue. So that is the footnote; I cannot
vouch for it, but if those are the two types of conduct, they
are enjoinable; there is a difference in terms of how the statute operates. Now, Mr. Hansen may disagree with me as to
whether it should operate that way or whether it constitutionally can operate that way, but there are different provisions of the CDA that have these different implications.
MS. AFTAB: Was your concern with your ability to receive something by e-mail, or were you concerned with your
ability to access it from a Website, whether voluntary or involuntary?
QUESTIONER: I think the concern of the court’s particular approach in writing the decision was the definition of
content. Footnote two of Shea says content includes the text,
the sound, or the images, and then it runs into the same
strain as the description of the definition. Yet, the CDA
seems to break it out.245 So, I wonder whether the court has
made some sort of mistake. If this is the case, future courts
will not be very clear, they will just continue to lump things
together. If, for example, the CDA is found constitutional,
we might get a broad-brush problem.
MS. AFTAB: I cannot comment on the Shea footnote because I do not recall it. But, I can tell you that many of the
judges are looking at jurisdictional issues, such as whether it
is information that is being sent to someone by way of unsolicited e-mail or list serves, or something that needs to be accessed from someone’s Web site to determine the location of
information. Although they consider the voluntary nature of
the communication, most courts are still coming to the same
conclusion. They find that you are subject to the jurisdiction
of their courts.
QUESTION: Why is it that a lot of Web masters do not
make their sites accessible to blind people who use com245. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223.
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puters with speech capability, and what can be done about it
from a technological standpoint?
MS. AFTAB: It looks like I am the technology person
again.
There are different kinds of Web sites. There are commercial Web sites that cost a lot of money, and then there are
Web sites that you or your neighbor may have put up. I
keep my own Web site up and running, which is why none
of my links work on a regular basis.
But there is a rapid growth of audio on the Net through
Java and other technology, and a lot of the people who put
up their Web sites want to use it. Unfortunately, it requires
greater knowledge and generally more Web site space with
the Website host company than most Website operators have
at this time. It is also harder to maintain as you add new
technology to your site. But, I think that the Web is a perfect
place to accommodate these special concerns. Many people
who have sight disabilities have computers that have speech
capabilities built into them that are increasingly allowing
them to use the Internet. But, it is an important issue and
something that we should be taking into consideration. It is
certainly something I will be looking at for our Web site as a
result of your question.
QUESTION: The Department of Justice’s brief in ACLU
v. Reno spent a lot of time arguing that the provisions of the
CDA should be separable, that each of the three provisions
should be looked at on its own merits.246 I was just wondering what the ACLU’s position is on whether the three provisions can be separated?
MR. HANSEN: The short answer is no. The government
will be surprised to learn that we do not agree with them.
The government did not make this argument below; this is
246. Brief for the Appellant at 18, Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (No. 96-511).
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something it has invented now that it has reached the Supreme Court. If you read the government’s brief carefully,
you will find that we still do not exactly know what its position is.
The government takes the position that the two knowing
clauses prohibit an individual from knowingly sending indecent material to a minor.247 But the example it uses is
enormously illustrative: it says if an individual goes into a
chat room or onto a news group and discovers that somebody in the chat room or in the news group is a minor, then
thereafter that individual may not send private e-mail that is
indecent to that minor. Through its method of analysis, the
government also implies that if the individual continues to
speak to the news group or the chat room knowing that a
minor has recently been there, that individual risks going to
jail under the indecency provision.248
What the government has refused thus far to clearly address is whether the knowing provisions apply to communications between one person to one person, or whether they
apply to any of the various one-to-many communications,
like chat rooms and news groups. If those two provisions
apply to the one-to-many conversations and address the
situation where I enter a news group and I see that two messages above me someone has posted a message that says,
“I’m seventeen and I come to this news group all the time,”
we still have the same problem. We would still have exactly
the same problem that adults now have which required
them to censor their speech in order to deal with the fact that
there are some minors out there. The government has studiously refused to go near this question and analyze it that
way.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Chris, I am intrigued by your background as an advocate for children’s rights. Let me ask you
247. Id. at 15.
248. Id.
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this: Dave Pawlik made the statement that there is a problem with indecency on the Internet concerning children. Is
that true? Is it injurious to kids to be exposed to indecency
on the Net; if so, is there anything that the government can
do to protect kids?
MR. HANSEN: It depends. The answer to the first part
of your question depends on what you mean by indecency,
the age of the kid, the maturity of the kid, and the nature of
the speech. There is certainly some speech on the Internet
that probably all of us would agree we would not want six-,
seven-, or eight-year-olds to see. There is probably also
speech on the Internet that some of us would find appropriate for a seventeen-year-old and some of us would find offensive for a seventeen-year-old. So, part of the problem, in
terms of whether there is a sufficient interest in banning
speech to children, depends on with what we are dealing.
MR. JOLLYMORE: What if we take the first category, the
speech we would all agree that we do not want certain age
groups to see?
MR. HANSEN: And what about that speech?
MR. JOLLYMORE: Well, is there anything the government can do to protect kids?
MR. HANSEN: Absolutely. What the government ought
to do in that context is something that is effective. One of
the many problems of the CDA is that it does not reach overseas sites. If the CDA is upheld, and if it were limited the
way you just described, that is, to that material that every
single American agreed was inappropriate for a nine-yearold, it would still not get the fifty percent of all sites that
originate overseas. It is just as cheap and easy to access a
site in Denmark as it is to access a site in the United States.
So, if we enforce the CDA, we will not have accomplished
anything toward the goal of protecting children.
By contrast, if the government encourages the use of parental blocking mechanisms, which parents can load onto
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their own home computers, such software would cover
overseas sites just as it would cover domestic sites. It will be
infinitely more effective in protecting the interests you are
describing and the interests many people want to protect.
Therefore, that is what the government ought to be doing.
MR. JOLLYMORE: I want to ask one quick question of
everyone on the panel: if you can step aside from your role
as an advocate, tell us briefly what you predict the Supreme
Court will do in ACLU v. Reno.
MR. HANSEN: I am too close to it. Because I am trying
to persuade them to move to a particular position, I cannot.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Parry?
MS. AFTAB: Can I say what I hope they are going to do?
I hope they are going to invalidate the issue on the indecency that is before the Court. I just think it is too broad and
I think it has very dangerous ramifications with the lowest
common denominator is being what a minor is supposed to
read. I hope that the remainder of the CDA survives, especially the section overruling the Stratton case concerning liability for online defamation.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Dave?
MR. PAWLIK: I think they will be consistent with the
channeling aspects of Pacifica and Sable and they will say that
the CDA is not an effective or constitutional method of
channeling.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Ted?
MR. HIRT: Like Chris, I will decline. Even though I do
not have a prudent reason for declining, my predictions on
what judges will do are not a batting average I would want
to share with any of you, in terms of district court, appellate
court, or Supreme Court.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Let me ask Preeta.
MS. BANSAL: I think they are going to strike it down
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using existing rules, and I think they are going to decline to
enunciate a broad standard for the Internet.
MR. JOLLYMORE: I am going to add my opinion. I
think they will strike it down too, for what it is worth. I
want to thank our panelists for participating and all of you
for staying a little later.

